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I. INTRODUCTION 
Current societies are far more interconnected than societies have ever 
been in the past.1  With the advances of technology and infrastructure, 
networks have quickly become an integral part of our daily lives.  A 
modern city would struggle to function without networks of waste 
management; sewers; power grids; water pipelines; transportation; 
distribution of goods, food, or services; health care; education; 
telecommunications; and banking.2  Most of these networks often span 
regionally and globally, generating networks of networks through an 
engineered “webbing of humanity.”3  When we update our status on 
Facebook, tweet, or share instant messages through mobile networks or 
communication apps on our smartphones, we are entangled in this web and 
proliferate it.  We aim to find jobs, friends, lovers, and spouses through 
networks engineered to computationally match the data that we provide.  
But networks do not only exist in the external world.  Our physiological 
construction operates through naturally occurring networks.  Brain 
development and function represent a highly complex, integrated network 
of signaling and communication among neurons and other nerve cells, 
muscles, or gland cells.  Proteins interact with other proteins in protein 
interaction networks.4 
This is the story of networks.  It is a fascinating tale that reaches 
across centuries and has become an important part of our lives, our 
communities, and of the world.  As networks continue to occupy an ever-
larger space in our daily realities, we need to understand them better than 
we currently do.  But despite or, perhaps, due to the embeddedness of 
networks in our physical, virtual, and physiological worlds, we are often 
unaware of their existence in legal systems—it is as if they are hidden in 
plain sight.  Even when we see them, we sometimes become oblivious to 
their operation or salience due to our preexisting systemic perceptions and 
mental blind spots.  The Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) has 
suggested that, unlike popular belief, the outside mirrors in a car can be 
adjusted to eliminate blind spots.5  When correctly positioned, the mirrors 
negate a car’s blind spots.  The only problem is getting used to the SAE-
recommended mirror positions.  Similarly, with our mental blind spots, 
 
 1  See generally COMMITTEE ON NETWORK SCIENCE FOR FUTURE ARMY APPLICATIONS 
ET AL., NETWORK SCIENCE 7 (2005). 
 2  BRUCE J. WEST & NICOLA SCAFETTA, DISRUPTED NETWORKS: FROM PHYSICS TO 
CLIMATE CHANGE 7 (2010). 
 3  Id.  
 4  Trey Ideker et al., Discovering Regulatory and Signaling Circuits in Molecular 
Interaction Networks, 18 BIOINFORMATICS S233 (2002). 
 5  George Platzer, The Geometry of Automotive Rearview Mirrors - Why Blind Zones 
Exist and Strategies to Overcome Them, SAE TECHNICAL PAPER 143 (1995). 
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training our “mental eyes” to see the world in networks will hopefully 
allow us to ease into seeing the international system in its networks too. 
The purpose of this article is twofold.  First, it aims to systematize 
some of the understandings that other disciplines have to offer in bringing 
together a set of “best practices” that will guide future research in 
recognizing, mapping, and utilizing networks in legislative action, and 
international legislative action in particular.  Second, it will provide a 
methodological framework of analysis and introduce a set of tools that will 
improve our understanding of contemporary international legislative action. 
In Part II of this article, I propose that we re-conceptualize the 
international legal system through a networks perspective.  I address first 
the different analytic lens that networks provide by looking at the ways 
various actors generally connect; how different patterns of connection yield 
different types of networks; and how the position, quantity, and quality of 
ties an actor has with other actors in the network determines leadership, 
influence, power, and effect within the network, but also of the network 
itself.  Then, I discuss how networks have emerged as salient structures in 
the international system and juxtapose this development to existing state-
centric perspectives of this system.  The purpose of this part is to show how 
we can learn to see the international system in networks.  This part of the 
Article captures an international reality in which states still retain their 
agency as important actors, while also connecting with other states and 
non-state actors through a multiplicity of networks.  In this world, states, 
government officials, agencies, international organizations, NGOs, 
corporations, and even individuals, all create networks that influence the 
international system, and each participant is capable of operating as a 
distinct actor within these networks towards legislative action. 
In Part III of the Article, I introduce a methodological framework for 
the study of networks as structures, examining their role and impact on the 
making of international law.  I put forward the main metrics of this 
framework based on social network analysis, its quantitative tools but also 
its limitations, to examine how agents connect and behave in small or large 
groups of actors that introduce, adopt, or dissolve international norms.  
This insight provides us with a tool to quantify and map actors’ and 
networks’ contributions to international legislative processes as well as 
interpret the elusive global realities that lead to international law making.  
It allows us to understand the wide spectrum of actors, structures, and 
designs involved in international law making and offers a way to quantify 
the impact and effect of these actors individually and collectively on the 
making of international law.  Finally, it can help us to tailor networked 
solutions to our international problems so that international legislative 
action can be more effective. 
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II. HOW NETWORKS MAKE US SEE THE LEGAL SYSTEM DIFFERENTLY 
A. Introducing Networks: From Kant to Facebook 
This story of networks begins in Königsberg, a small Russian semi-
exclave between Poland and Lithuania on the southeastern corner of the 
Baltic Sea now called Kaliningrad.  The 18th century philosopher Immanuel 
Kant lived there, when it was still part of the Kingdom of Prussia, and he 
was known there as Immanuel “the Königsberg clock.”6  Kant was 
renowned for his strict daily routines and his regular walks around the city.  
While we do not know his exact routine, most likely, on these walks, he 
would encounter one of Königsberg’s seven famous bridges. 
The bridges had spurred an urban riddle known as the “Königsberg 
bridge problem”: is it possible to walk around the city across all seven 
bridges without crossing the same bridge twice?7  Leonhard Euler, one of 
the greatest mathematicians of the time, began to solve this enigma.  
Perhaps without knowing it, Euler developed a new type of mathematics 
called graph theory.  By turning the city into a graph, Euler labeled each of 
the four land masses surrounding the bridges as nodes, and the bridges as 
links among those nodes.8  By analyzing the structure of the graph, Euler 
proved that the only way someone could walk across the bridges only once 
would be if there were an even number of bridges and that, in Königsberg’s 
seven bridges, such thing would be impossible.9  This study introduced the 
method of graph theory as a way of analyzing networks.  And, while we 
never learned of Kant’s true walking routine, we are now sure of one thing: 
Kant never crossed all seven bridges without crossing at least one of them 
twice. 
While the seven bridges of Königsberg were the springboard for the 
emergence of graph theory in spatial networks, the first analysis of a social 
network took place in New York.  In 1932, the New York State Training 
School for Girls in Hudson approached J. L. Moreno to address an outbreak 
of fourteen girls running away in two weeks’ time.10  Instead of addressing 
each case individually, Moreno mapped all fourteen girls on a graph to 
 
 6  John Merrick, Immanuel Kant the, Errrr, Walker?, VERSO (Apr. 30, 2015), www.ver 
sobooks.com/blogs/1963-immanuel-kant-the-errrr-walker.  
 7  Rob Shields, Cultural Topology: The Seven Bridges of Königsburg, 1736, 29 
THEORY, CULTURE & SOC’Y 43, 44 (2012). 
 8  Leonhard Euler, Solutio problematis ad geometriam situs pertinentes, 8 
COMMENTARII ACADEMIAE SCIENTIARUM PETROPOLITANAE 128 (1741).  See also Gary 
Chartrand, The Königsberg Bridge Problem: An Introduction to Eulerian Graphs, 
in INTRODUCTORY GRAPH THEORY 51–66 (1985). 
 9  Euler, supra note 8, at 128. 
 10  See Diana Jones, Emotions Mapped by New Geography: Charts Seek to Portray the 
Psychological Currents of Human Relationships, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 1933, at 17.  
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assess how each influenced the other in bringing about a social “epidemic.”  
Moreno used network diagrams called “sociograms” to assign students to 
various residential cottages.11  He found that assignments that considered 
the results of his sociometric findings substantially reduced the number of 
runaways from the school.12 
At P.S. 181 in Brooklyn, Moreno applied his sociograms to observe 
the relationships between boys and girls in grades kindergarten through 
eighth grade.13  Moreno and his research team recorded the children’s 
choices of who to sit next to while studying or playing.  They then 
constructed sociograms with triangles representing boys and circles 
representing girls and the students’ initials in the middle.  Moreno’s 
sociograms from a fourth-grade class indicates that not much has changed 
in over 80 years within children’s society.  The girls are clustered on the 
one side, the boys on the other, with only one “brave” boy reaching out to 
one girl to sit next to.  The sociogram also indicates an isolated pair of girls 
that only reached out to each other.  A teacher in this class back then or 
even today could use this sociogram to keep an eye out for classroom 
interactions, including bullying, while more elaborate analysis could shed 
light on nuanced classroom dynamics. 
Moreno’s sociograms opened the door to further systematization of 
networks and analysis of their role in our daily lives.  But before Moreno, 
the Hungarian writer Frigyes Karinthy devised a notion of peoples’ 
proximity in a short fiction story called “Chain Links” in 1929.14  To 
demonstrate that people were closer at that time than ever before, 
Karinthy’s fictional protagonist proposed a test.  He bet that his friends 
could name any person within Earth’s entire population and through at 
most five friends or acquaintances, one of which he knew personally, he 
could link himself to this randomly selected person.15  This idea, also called 
“the small-world problem,” fascinated social scientists and laymen alike.  
In the 1950s, two scientists, Ithiel de Sola Pool and Manfred Kochen, set 
out to test the theory—known as the “small world problem— 
mathematically.16  But despite their success in framing the question 
 
 11  Id.   
 12  JACOB L. MORENO, WHO SHALL SURVIVE? FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIOMETRY, GROUP 
PSYCHOTHERAPY AND SOCIODRAMA 527 (1934). 
 13  Id. at 13.   
 14  Frigyes Karinthy, Chain Links, in THE STRUCTURE AND DYNAMICS OF NETWORKS 21, 
22 (Mark Newman et al. eds., 2006). 
 15  Id. 
 16  Charles Korte & Stanley Milgram, Acquaintance Networks Between Racial Groups: 
Application of the Small World Method, 15 J. PERSONALITY SOC. PSYCHOL. 101, 101 (1970) 
(referencing Ithiel de Sola Pool and Manfed Kochen); Ithiel de Sola Pool & Manfred 
Kochen, Contacts and Influence, 1 SOC. NETWORKS 5, 7 (1978). 
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mathematically, they were still unable to solve the problem twenty years 
later.17 
Social psychologist Stanley Milgram undertook a 1967 study that 
served as the first empirical approach to the small-world problem.  
Milgram’s goal was to test the degrees of separation between any two 
random individuals in the United States by answering the question of how 
many acquaintances it took to connect them.18  He first chose the wife of a 
divinity graduate student in Sharon, Massachusetts and a stockbroker in 
Boston, Massachusetts as the two targets of his study.  He then chose 
Wichita, Kansas and Omaha, Nebraska, as the two starting points of the 
study because “from Cambridge, these cities seem vaguely ‘out there,’ on 
the Great Plains or somewhere.”19  At the time, there was nearly no 
consensus as to how many links it would take to connect people from such 
remote areas.  Milgram wrote, “[r]ecently, when I asked a person of 
intelligence how many steps he thought it would take, and he estimated that 
it would require 100 intermediate persons, or more, to move from Nebraska 
to Sharon.”20 
Milgram sent letters to these individuals detailing the study and some 
basic information about either of the two target contact persons in Boston.21  
He also included a roster on which they would write their own names.  
Upon receiving these, the volunteers were asked if they personally knew 
the contact person designated by Milgram in Boston.  In the unlikely case 
that they knew this person, they had to forward the letter directly to them.  
In the more likely case that they did not know this person, they were asked 
to think of a friend or a relative whom they knew and was more likely to 
know the target.  They were then asked to sign this person’s name on the 
roster and forward it to them.  When the package eventually reached the 
final target in Boston, the researchers examined the roster to count the 
number of times the package had been forwarded.22  Milgram’s study—
published in 1967—found that the messages were delivered by “chains” 
comprising anywhere between two and ten intermediaries, with the average 
number being five intermediaries.23 
Milgram’s experiment sprung out of a desire to better understand how 
people were connected.  Most importantly, Milligram’s study proved that 
 
 17  Korte & Stanley Milgram, supra note 16.  
 18  Jeffrey Travers & Stanley Milgram, The Small World Problem, 1 PSYCHOL. TODAY 
61, 62 (1967). 
 19  Id. at 64. 
 20  Id. at 65. 
 21  Id. at 60–67.  
 22  Id.  
 23  Id. at 65. 
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the world is a much smaller social network of interlinked individuals than 
we ever imagined and provided the ultimate benchmark against which our 
interconnectedness these days can be measured. 
Indeed, Facebook decided to run its own experiment based on 
Milligram’s idea to find whether the median number of five intermediaries 
that Milgram had found still stood today.  While Karinthy had speculated, 
and Milgram proved, that a chain of just five individuals between people 
can link any two on the planet, Facebook’s studies across years suggest that 
the world is growing smaller and smaller while we become more and more 
interconnected.24  In 2011, when Facebook had just over one tenth of the 
world’s population as active users, they found that there were 3.74 degrees 
of separation.25  In 2016, with Facebook’s active users increasing to 1.5 
billion—roughly one quarter of the world’s population—the research 
suggested that there are 3.57 degrees of separation.  In other words, if you 
pick any two Facebook users, each is connected to every other person by an 
average of three and a half other people.26 
Today, social media platforms have taken it upon themselves to 
capitalize on pre-existing human networks but also boost peoples’ 
interconnectedness.  With technological advances making the relevance of 
networks in our daily lives and the world ever more evident, the 
significance of networks cannot be overstated. 
B. The Different Lens of Networks 
The term “network” is used almost open-endedly to refer to several 
structural formations across disciplines.  In the widely-cited definition of 
Joel M. Podolny and Karen L. Page, a network is “any collection of actors 
(n≥2) that pursue repeated, enduring exchange of relations with one another 
and, at the same time, lack a legitimate organizational authority to arbitrate 
and resolve disputes that may arise during the exchange.”27  In scholarship, 
networks are usually juxtaposed with markets and hierarchies, as 
alternative structures.28  Fields as diverse as social sciences, biology, 
engineering, computer science, and organizational studies, have identified 
and recognized the importance of networks and their role in the 
development of a “systems theory” in each respective discipline.29 
 
 24  Smriti Bhagat et al., Three and a Half Degrees of Separation, FACEBOOK RES. (Feb. 
4, 2016), https://research.fb.com/blog/2016/02/three-and-a-half-degrees-of-separation/. 
 25  Facebook Users Average 3.74 Degrees of Separation, BBC NEWS (Nov. 23, 2011), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-15844230. 
 26  Bhagat, supra note 24.  
 27  Joel M. Podolny & Karen L. Page, Network Forms of Organization, 24 ANN. REV. 
SOC. 57, 59 (1998).  
 28  MILES KAHLER, NETWORKED POLITICS: AGENCY, POWER, AND GOVERNANCE 2 (2015). 
 29  See, e.g., Michael G.H. Bell, A Game Theory Approach to Measuring the 
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In terms of structure, the core building blocks of a network are its 
nodes and edges.30  A node is usually an actor and edges represent the 
relationships among multiple nodes.  In other words, a network is a set of 
interconnected nodes.  What constitutes a node and an edge depends on the 
context and application of a network.  These can be people and the 
relationships among them.  They can be countries and their global trade 
relationships.  They can be poppy fields and clandestine drug trafficking 
groups.  They can be stock exchange markets and service centers in global 
financial flows.  They can be Hollywood actors and the movies they star in. 
The term “network” has been applied liberally due to the unique 
nature of each network.  But networks traditionally share a set of minimum 
common characteristics such as participation, process, enforcement, and 
institutionalization.31  The main construction of the term “network” across 
fields reflects a group of nonhierarchical but heavily interdependent 
entities.32  These entities often exhibit high levels of informality in 
collaboration while demonstrating increased rule making functions.33  This 
very nature of networks often offers a fast and flexible alternative to 
traditional organization and rulemaking that can provide more expedient 
and effective responses.  This is one of the most important characteristics 
for the role of networks in international law making that will be the focus 
of our analysis of networks in the international system. 
But before jumping to the legal and international system there is a 
more elementary set of questions that linger: why do networks emerge and 
what warrants their analysis?  Networks, as structures, fall in the middle 
between hierarchies and markets.  On the one hand, hierarchies represent 
 
Performance Reliability of Transport Networks, 34 TRANSP. RES. PART B: 
METHODOLOGICAL 533, 533 (2000); Jennifer A. Dunne et al., Food-Web Structure and 
Network Theory: The Role of Connectance and Size, 99 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 12917, 
12917 (2002); Alireza Khotanzad et al., ANNSTLF-Artificial Neural Network Short-Term 
Electric Load Forecasting System Generation Three, 13 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON POWER 
SYS. 1413, 1413 (1997); Michael J. Lovaglia et al., Negotiated Exchanges in Social 
Networks, 74 SOC. FORCES 123, 123 (1995); Ron Milo et al., Network Motifs: Simple 
Building Blocks of Complex Networks, 298 SCI. 824, 824−25 (2002); R. Bruce Money, 
International Multilateral Negotiations and Social Networks, 29 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 695, 
695 (1998).  
 30  David Lazer, Networks and Politics: The Case of Human Rights, in UNDERSTANDING 
SOCIAL ACTION, PROMOTING HUMAN RIGHTS 246 (Ryan Goodman et al. eds., 2012). 
 31  Abraham Newman & David T. Zaring, Regulatory Networks: Power, Legitimacy, 
and Compliance, in INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THE STATE OF THE ART 244, 245 (Jeffrey Dunoff & Mark 
Pollack eds., 2013). 
 32  Lazer, supra note 30, at 245. 
 33  Id.; Yane Svetiev, The Limits of Informal International Law, in INFORMAL 
INTERNATIONAL LAWMAKING 271, 271 (Joost Pauwelyn et al. eds., 2012). 
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an organizational model that is based on rule-driven design and direction.34  
Markets, on the other hand, are largely decentralized and achieve 
coordination by using intuitive methods such as signaling.35  Networks are 
neither as rigid as hierarchies nor as fluid as markets.  Instead, they contain 
more informal linkages than the heavily bureaucratic hierarchies but have a 
more sophisticated organizational coordination beyond the mere signaling 
mechanisms of markets.  They tend to emerge where markets and 
hierarchies are not present or are unable to provide a necessary or optimal 
organizational platform for action.36 
There is not one clear explanation as to why networks emerge.  
Optimistic functionalism often answers the question “why do networks 
emerge?” by justifying the end result of delivering a beneficial outcome.37  
Yet organizational structures may also emerge and persist through time due 
to convenience, habit, or inertia, without necessarily carrying a functional 
advantage over others.38  While hierarchies tend to be too rigid and value 
rank over flexibility and agility, markets are too opportunistic and short-
termed to provide actors with sufficient and well-informed results.39  A 
hybrid organizational form like the network falls into neither of these traps: 
it carries some of the flexibility of markets and combines it with the more 
principled and less opportunistic reciprocal approach of hierarchies.  
Networks are also capable of having their own distributions of power, 
hierarchy, and governance.40  They do not always function as flat 
environments of link distribution, but rather as “scale-free” entities with 
actors that may assume more or less dominant positions based on their 
centrality within the network.41  Networks are thus usually quicker to react 
than hierarchies and more effective to respond to complexity than 
markets.42  These three organizational models may also exist in symbiosis, 
such as networks we encounter within hierarchical environments or 
 
 34  GRAHAME THOMPSON, BETWEEN HIERARCHIES AND MARKETS: THE LOGIC AND LIMITS 
OF NETWORK FORMS OF ORGANIZATION 22 (2003) 
 35  Id. at 24. 
 36   ROBERT J. HOLTON, GLOBAL NETWORKS 32 (2007).  
 37  See Timur Kuran, The Tenacious Past: Theories of Personal and Collective 
Conservatism, 10 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 143, 144 (1988).  
 38   HOLTON, supra note 36, at 33.  
 39   HOLTON, supra note 36, at 35. 
 40  CHARLI R. CARPENTER, “LOST” CAUSES: AGENDA VETTING IN GLOBAL ISSUE 
NETWORKS AND THE SHAPING OF HUMAN SECURITY 20 (2014).  
 41  The term “scale-free” refers to the following property.  Consider degree d and some 
other degree cd, for some scalar c and a parameter y.  Their relative frequencies are 
𝑑−𝑦 (𝑐𝑑−𝑦)𝑜𝑟⁄ 𝑐𝑦.  Now consider some other degree 𝑑′
 
and another degree 𝑐𝑑′.  Their 
relative frequencies are also 𝑐𝑦.  Thus, regardless of how we have rescaled things, relative 
frequencies depend only on relative sizes and not on the absolute scale. 
 42  HOLTON, supra note 36, at 35.  
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markets.43  But, at all times, configuring the relationships among the nodes 
of networks helps to map how these structures function and to measure 
their various effects.44 
There are many systems of interest to researchers that are structured 
as networks, from the Internet and World Wide Web, to social interactions, 
human societies, chemical particles, products distribution, military 
alliances, and interactions among judges and courts.  Certain mathematical 
and statistical tools can reduce these systems from abstract structures to 
sets of simplified representations of connections and patterns.  This method 
has its limitations but offers important advantages, especially when 
combined with additional or mixed research methods.  Getting accustomed 
to seeing the world through networks requires a conceptual and 
epistemological shift that some disciplines have embraced more than 
others.  Surveying the way the introduction of a networks perspective has 
affected the closest discipline to international law, that of international 
relations, will help us better implement this shift in the way we perceive the 
international legal system, and thereby come to understand it better. 
C. Networks in the International Legal System 
To explore the ways in which actors connect, it is critical to establish 
an analytical framework.  One of the primary purposes of international law 
has been to facilitate solutions in different sets of problems caused by the 
anarchical international system and its central governance vacuum.45  The 
range of international problems that could trigger international normative 
development is nearly infinite.  But under such problem-driven approach, 
one can identify certain types of networks that preexist or emerge to 
address a certain type of problem through normative development such as 
treaty, customary international law, or even soft law. 
These networks represent any empirically verifiable and demonstrable 
group of actors and their interactions throughout certain law making 
processes that lead to international normative development.46  These can 
include but are not limited to states, international organizations, non-
governmental organizations, international or domestic courts and tribunals, 
and even corporations or individuals.  There is no established line of 
demarcation separating the actors that may be involved in the networks and 
those that may not for the purposes of research analysis.  The deciding 
factor for these actors is simply their connection to other actors involved in 
 
 43  HOLTON, supra note 36, at 37. 
 44  Lazer, supra note 30, at 245. 
 45  See Irena Omelaniuk, Global Migration Institutions and Processes, in FOUNDATIONS 
OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION LAW 336 (Brian Opeskin et al. eds., 2012).  
 46  See supra notes 20–27.   
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international legislative processes.  The goal then is to map, through 
quantitative means, which actors contribute what to the legislative network, 
or to the process of normative development, and why. 
Networks were introduced in politics and international relations in the 
1970s in an effort to unpack traditional concepts of what constitutes the 
“state.”47  International political economy began to focus its analytical lens 
on sub-state interactions and their policy outcomes as a result of the forces 
of growing economic and political interdependence.48  Robert Keohane and 
Joseph Nye introduced and defined the concept of “transgovernmental 
relations” as relations between officials “that are not controlled or closely 
guided by the policies of the cabinets or chief executives of those 
governments.”49  The 1980s decline of the US hegemony and rise of new 
powers engendered further theories that focused on the interactions of 
different sets of actors beyond unitary states within the international 
system.50  In the 1990s, Peter Haas promulgated the idea of an “epistemic 
community” operating as “a network of professionals with recognized 
expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim 
to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area.”51  Anne-
Marie Slaughter advanced the idea of a “new world order” that is 
increasingly shaped by networks of lower-level governmental officials with 
cross-border policy agendas.52  These officials’ formal or informal 
interactions with their foreign counterparts and without direct central 
authority involvement gives them a special role in cross-border 
regulation.53 
These developments have led to a conceptual and epistemological 
shift from states as sole unitary actors acting within an international system 
that appeared to have space only for them, to their “disaggregation” into 
their many individual components.54  Some early scholars in international 
 
 47  Newman & Zaring, supra note 31, at 248; see also ROBERT O. KEOHANE & JOSEPH S. 
NYE, POWER AND INTERDEPENDENCE 8 (1977); THOMAS RISSE-KAPPEN, BRINGING 
TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS BACK IN: NON-STATE ACTORS, DOMESTIC STRUCTURES AND 
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 15 (1995). 
 48  Kal Rausiala, The Rise of Transnational Networks Conference November 7, 2008 
Transnational Networks: Past and Present, 43 INT’L L. 205, 206 (2009). 
 49  KEOHANE & NYE, supra note 47, at 42. 
 50  Anne-Marie Slaughter & David Zaring, Networking Goes International: An Update, 
2 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 211, 214 (2006). 
 51  Peter M. Haas, Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy 
Coordination, 46 INT’L ORG. 1, 3 (1992). 
 52  Anne-Marie Slaughter, Sovereignty and Power in a Networked World Order, 40 
STAN. J. INT’L L. 40, 283 (2004).  
 53  ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 62 (2009). 
 54   See KEOHANE & NYE, supra note 47, at 8; RISSE-KAPPEN, supra note 47, at 15; 
Newman & Zaring, supra note 31, at 248; Slaughter, supra note 52, at 283. 
BANTEKA (DO NOT DELETE) 11/14/2019  5:19 PM 
350 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:339 
law had also emphasized the importance of tracing the rise, position, and 
relationships of those components, some of which, in lieu of a better term,55 
became known as “non-state actors.”56  Legal process theorists first 
introduced the idea of a web of state and non-state actors in the 1950s and 
1960s without developing a comprehensive theory on their role and effect 
in international law.57  This was likely due to strict conceptions of “legal 
personality” that barred such informal structures from having a seat at the 
table of the exclusive club of state actors participating in international law 
and international relations.58  At the same time, cross-border disputes 
presented issues for which traditional international law tools were not 
equipped to handle and caused some areas of international law to witness 
increased network proliferation.59  Fields such as environmental law and 
international financial regulation were increasingly exposed to challenges 
that required a new type of international coordination addressing the 
practical necessities of international interdependence.60  These ventures, 
however, lacked a more comprehensive conceptual framework of analysis, 
or were simply viewed as practical instead of binding legislative 
coordinative efforts in response to systemic deficiencies.61  The networks 
scholarship that emerged in these fields mostly assumed the more limited 
task of documenting the evolution of regulatory networks and their effect 
on actors’ structures and power distributions.62 
In sum, the field of international relations has been preoccupied with 
questions relating to the nature of these networks of state and non-state 
actors,63 their operations,64 and their effect on power distributions,65 policy 
 
 55  As Philip Alston suggested, international law suffers from the “not-a-cat-syndrome” 
in its reference to “non-state actors” as “non-state.”  See Philip Alston, The ‘Not-a-Cat’ 
Syndrome: Can the International Human Rights Regime Accommodate Non-State Actors?, 
in NON-STATE ACTORS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 3, 3 (Philip Alston ed., 2005).  This 
marginalizes the scope of research and reinforces “the assumption that the state is the only 
central actor.”  Id.  
 56  See generally PHILIP CARYL JESSUP, TRANSNATIONAL LAW (1956) (discussing Philip 
Jessup as having introduced international lawyers to “transnational law” in 1958 and 
defining it as “all law which regulates actions or events that transcend national frontiers.  
Both public and private International Law are included, as are other rules which do not 
wholly fit into such standard categories.”); see also HENRY J. STEINER & DETLEV F. VAGTS, 
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS (1976) (describing how Henry Steiner and Detlev Vagts 
later translated this concept into a case-book, collecting materials designed to bridge the gap 
between the domestic and international legal world in HENRY J. STEINER ET AL., 
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS: MATERIALS AND TEXT (1986)).  
 57   Slaughter & Zaring, supra note 50, at 213. 
 58   Id. 
 59   Slaughter & Zaring, supra note 50, at 215. 
 60   Id.; Raustiala, supra note 48, at 206. 
 61  Slaughter & Zaring, supra note 50, at 214. 
 62  Slaughter & Zaring, supra note 50, at 211–12. 
 63  Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of International Cooperation: Transgovernmental 
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convergence,66 and agenda setting.67  International legal scholarship has 
largely shied away from the complications that non-state actors and the 
networks they tap into present to traditionally rigid areas such as that of 
international law making.68  The study of non-state actors and the networks 
they belong to in international law has been limited to identifying the 
relationships among non-state actors and states under the assumption that 
the former lack any constitutive legislative power.  This establishes a gap 
between the policy nature and effect of non-state actors and networks, on 
the one hand, and their potential legislative effect, on the other. 
But an extraordinary range of international law norms is created today 
by actors and through processes that do not fit easily into the traditional 
state actors of international law.69  Although states remain the primary 
makers of international law, many other participants including international 
organizations, courts, as well as influential entities in international law 
advocacy, such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and even 
individuals, are also crucial to the development of international legal 
norms.70  One of the problems in contemporary international law is the 
disconnect between the way international law is actually made with the 
participation of these various actors, on the one hand, and the extensive 
theoretical focus on states and their effect on the four classic international 
law “sources,” on the other.  While scholars are not blind to this gap, there 
is, of yet, no formal model integrating these actors into existing 
frameworks “that are theoretically and legally structured only for states.”71  
The next part of this Article aims to narrow this gap by providing a 
framework of analysis for the contributions of these actors and structures to 
the making of international law. 
Configuring the relationships among the actors, or, as we will be 
calling them, nodes of these networks will help us understand how these 
 
Networks and the Future of International Law, 43 VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 3 (2002); see also 
Newman & Zaring, supra note 31, at 253. 
 64  Slaughter, supra note 52, at 290.  
 65  Id.  
 66  Raustiala, supra note 48, at 209.  
 67   CARPENTER, supra note 40, at 20. 
 68  For a notable exception to this proposition see Mark A. Pollack & Gregory C. 
Shaffer, The Interaction of Formal and Informal International Lawmaking, in INFORMAL 
INTERNATIONAL LAWMAKING 251 (Joost Pauwelyn ed., 2012). 
 69  See generally Duncan B. Hollis, Why State Consent Still Matters—Non-State Actors, 
Treaties, and the Changing Sources of International Law, 23 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 137 
(2005). 
 70  See generally ALAN BOYLE & CHRISTINE CHINKIN, THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW (2007). 
 71  ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, THE CHESSBOARD AND THE WEB: STRATEGIES OF 
CONNECTION IN A NETWORKED WORLD 22–23 (2017). 
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networks are involved in international law making, and measure their 
actual legislative effect.72  Many of the networks that have been involved in 
international norm creation are not networks comprised only of states or 
networks comprised only of non-state actors.  Instead, they are structures 
with their own types of relationships and hierarchies in which different 
types of actors participate, including states and non-state actors.  The 
evaluation of the actor distributions and relationships within these networks 
will elucidate the ways that normative prescriptions are adopted, diffused, 
and cascade, as well as clarify how these emerging norms find their way to 
the table, proliferate, and become part of international law.73  Seeing 
international relations and international law through networks will provide 
international lawyers and international policy-makers with a descriptive 
tool that translates and maps the elusive process of international law 
making. 
But why would international actors engage in such a paradigm shift 
that arguably reduces the role of states in international relations and law?  
Considering states have traditionally held certain monopolies of power, 
such as the monopoly of making international law, it seems almost 
counterintuitive that they would choose to engage in relationships with 
non-state actors through networks instead of following traditional paths of 
rule-making.  Non-state actors are becoming increasingly influential, due, 
in large part, to the inadequacy of the strict hierarchical state-centered 
international system to effectively address emerging international law 
problems, such as human rights violations, environmental issues, and 
international financial crises.74  Yet states remain the main actor that can 
officially legislate in the international terrain, and exercise legitimate 
influence and coercion over private actors or organizations.75  This 
conundrum has led many non-state actors that were at first critical of the 
state system to engage more constructively with it.  This process has 
yielded the formation of these networks of state and non-state actors.76 
Non-state actors also realize that they do not have enough authority to 
develop legally-binding norms.  They must promote these norms through 
transnational campaigns that inform and persuade other actors of their 
 
 72  See Lazer, supra note 30, at 245. 
 73  For advocacy agenda setting under a similar light see generally CARPENTER, supra 
note 40. 
 74  See generally Angela M. Banks, The Growing Impact of Non-State Actors on the 
International and European Legal Systems, 5 INTERNATIONAL LAW FORUM DU DROIT 
INTERNATIONAL 293 (2003). 
 75  JAMES CRAWFORD, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION’S ARTICLES ON STATE 
RESPONSIBILITY: INTRODUCTION, TEXT AND COMMENTARIES 77–121 (2002).  
 76  Kal Raustiala, States, NGOs, and International Environmental Institutions, 41 INT’L 
STUD. Q. 719, 736 (1997). 
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cause.77  These transnational actors are a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for the diffusion and adoption of emerging norms.  Non-state 
actors eventually need to gain the support of states, tap into their processes, 
and inform and influence their beliefs and practice.  Sikkink argues that 
non-state actors do so through their only available tool, the power of 
persuasion.78  She bases this argument on what she believes is the inability 
of these groups to “coerce” agreement with a norm.  Instead, they can only 
rely on discourse, information, and often-dramatized symbolic activity.79  
This rings true in a hierarchical international system, where the state is on 
the top of the pyramid.  But in a world of networks that involve states as 
well as non-state actors, the linkages connecting them, and their individual 
positions, are of the essence.  In this more fluid environment, state and non-
state actors enjoy different structural positions, levels of power and 
influence, and carry diverse sets of tools than in the hierarchical system.  
As a node in the network, non-state actors, for instance, may position 
themselves in ways that confer certain aspects of structural power and 
influence without having this power as a matter of law.  In analyzing these 
relationships with the toolset of network theory, we will find that this new 
structural environment offers a means to overcome the inflexibility of 
hierarchies, particularly in new international law challenges, without 
running the risk of the potential haphazard effect of markets. 
Slaughter argues that the continued interaction of sub-state actors 
within transgovernmental networks will advance international cooperation 
and reduce international conflict.80  She also posits that a combination of 
perspectives that includes seeing states as unitary actors and as sites of 
different networks offers a way to see the world “in stereo” without either 
perspective excluding the other.81  This, for Slaughter, will facilitate the 
 
 77   See, e.g., MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS: 
ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 1—3 (1998) (discussing the non-state 
actors’ role in the anti-slavery campaign, the campaign for women’s suffrage, campaigns for 
international human rights and the elimination of violence against women); Audie Klotz, 
Norms Reconstituting Interests: Global Racial Equality and U.S. Sanctions Against South 
Africa, 49 INT’L ORG. 451, 451 (1995) (discussing the development of international racial 
norms in favor of an international anti-apartheid campaign against South Africa); Richard 
Price, Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Society Targets Land Mines, 52 INT’L 
ORG. 613, 613 (1998) (discussing non-state actors’ role in recent campaigns against the use 
of landmines); Thomas Risse-Kappen, Ideas Do Not Float Freely: Transnational 
Coalitions, Domestic Structures, and the End of the Cold War, 48 INT’L ORG. 185, 187 
(1994) (discussing the role of transnational networks of “epistemic communities” in 
influencing policy). 
 78  Kathryn Sikkink, Transnational Politics, International Relations Theory, and Human 
Rights, 31 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 517, 519 (1998). 
 79  Id.  
 80  SLAUGHTER, supra note 53, at 169–70.  
 81  SLAUGHTER, supra note 71, at 66–69. 
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development of a set of tools to address the hardest foreign policy problems 
by making use of resilience, task and scale based networks.82  Raustiala 
considers certain international networks as a tool states can use to more 
effectively meet international challenges.83  Zaring maintains that networks 
of regulators can more efficiently respond to globalization challenges and 
contribute to the rule of law by increasingly incorporating law-like 
features.84  Dunoff sees the growth of international networks as an 
opportunity for wider participation of non-state actors and particularly the 
civil society in international law making.85  Even though these arguments 
are intuitively compelling, they lack the descriptive analysis that serves as a 
blueprint of exactly how these networks operate and what they produce.  A 
quantitative method of analysis can assess not only whether these 
propositions are accurate, but also decode the intricacies of these new 
social and organizational structures, and facilitate even more sophisticated 
qualitative findings. 
For this reason, it is salient to identify the relevant actors who 
participate in international legal processes, their various degrees of 
participation, and their capabilities.86  This necessitates a descriptive 
approach that has been largely absent from the scholarship or has been 
unsystematic.  The question of who participates in these networks and on 
what grounds is of particular importance to understanding these processes 
and evaluating how they fit within the existing frameworks of international 
law development.87  Descriptive quantitative work can clarify network 
dynamics such as levels of socialization within a network or networks, 
diffusion of norms based on the nature and strength of actors or ties, the 





 82  SLAUGHTER, supra note 71, at 77. 
 83  Raustiala, supra note 63, at 17–19. 
 84  David Zaring, International Law by Other Means: The Twilight Existence of 
International Financial Regulatory Organizations, 33 TEX. INT’L L. J. 281, 323–25 (1998). 
 85  See Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Public Participation in the Trade Regime: Of Litigation, 
Frustration, Agitation and Legitimation, 56 RUTGERS L. REV. 961, 964 (2004). 
 86  Andrea Bianchi, The Fight for Inclusion: Non-State Actors and International Law, in 
FROM BILATERALISM TO COMMUNITY INTEREST: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF JUDGE BRUNA SIMMA 
39, 48 (Ulrich Fasenrath et al. eds., 2011). 
 87   Id. at 48–49. 
 88  Emily M. Hafner-Burton, Miles Kaahler, & Alexander H. Montgomery, Network 
Analysis for International Relations, 63 INT’L ORG. 559, 569 (2009). 
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D. Potential Objections Against Networks 
Examining networks of actors on the basis of their involvement in 
international legislative processes carries an obvious endemic objection, an 
elephant in the room.  This elephant, though capable of manifesting in 
various forms, goes by the name “legal personality.”  While actors such as 
non-governmental organizations, international or domestic courts and 
tribunals, and even individuals may participate in and interact throughout 
certain international law making processes,89 they do not, as a matter of 
law, have the necessary legal personality to create international law.90  And 
without legal personality, one may be tempted to call this a futile exercise.  
If these non-state actors aren’t capable of making international law because 
they lack formal recognition as international law makers, why should they 
even form part of the analysis?  In a legal system where legislative process 
and action were fully understood, articulated, and definite, this objection 
would be credible.  The current international law terrain, however, far from 
offers unambiguous answers concerning its normative development. 
What happens if, for the sake of the argument, the proposed analysis 
indicates that non-state actors have equal, if not more, power in putting 
forward new or amended international law norms than states?  Notice the 
circularity problem: if we are to continue to operate under the presumption 
that actors that are currently lacking legal personality but are actively 
participating in international legislative processes don’t matter for 
international law making, then we may never trace and understand their de 
facto role in them.  Yet such increased appreciation may assist in clearing 
out the existing clouds surrounding the development of international law 
and perhaps even clarify the source of our haze.  The goal of this Article is 
not to make any normative claim over the nature and legal position of non-
state actors.  Instead, it carves out a far more limited and perhaps less 
ambitious task.  That is to offer a framework with which to map which 
actors contribute what to the process of international normative 
development and how.  For these purposes, certain objections become less 
salient or “objectionable.” 
 
 
 89   CRAWFORD, supra note 75, at 30; Hollis, supra note 69, at 137.  
 90  See Reparation for Injuries Suffered in Service of United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 
1949 I.C.J. 174, 178 (Apr. 11).  A development that expanded notions of legal personality in 
current mainstream approaches to international law is the case of International 
Organizations that enjoy legal personality in relation to the states that created or interact 
with them.  Id.  Despite this relative exception of International Organizations to the general 
legal personality the debate still stands often in relation to other non-state actors but also 
International Organizations.  
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1. The “Subjects” Doctrine 
International legal doctrine is preoccupied with identifying the ways 
of determining who has the legal personality and, therefore, authority to 
create international law – rendered as “subjects” of international law – but 
also, the legitimacy to participate in international legislative processes with 
normative effect.91  Meanwhile, developments in international relations do 
not always render the social structure of international law and its “subjects” 
as mutually constitutive.”92  The emergence of different actors in the 
international community with a “variety of participants, making claims 
across state lines” has blurred the strict line of demarcation between 
“subjects” and “non-subjects” of international law.93  It is true that when 
“one tries to define the precise extent of the legal personality which non-
state actors have acquired, one enters into a very controversial area of the 
law.  The problem of including new actors in the legal system is reflected in 
the very concept of legal personality.”94  Challenges to traditional 
conceptions of legal personality in international law not only question the 
role of the state, but also the subject versus non-subject binary.  It is 
precisely the growing number of non-state actors that take part in 
international law making processes, originally reserved for states, that lead 
us to ask whether the notion of legal personality has changed, or whether 
we witness different levels and forms of legal personality that diverge from 
the “original” one that attached only to states regarding international law 
making.95 
Most objections and skepticism on the inclining role of non-state 
actors in international law arise from this emphasis on legal personality.  
Few attempts have been made to establish a new working framework 
separate from the traditional “subjects doctrine” that could incorporate the 
increased influence and participation of non-state actors in international 
law making.  Some argue that de facto influential actors in international 
law making – be it state or non-state actors –  have a normative 
responsibility,96 and a presumed duty to conform to international 
obligations attached to “the promotion of community interests such as the 
 
 91  Bianchi, supra note 86, at 42. 
 92  Bianchi, supra note 86, at 41. 
 93  ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HOW WE USE 
IT 150 (1994). 
 94  ALEXANDER ORAKHELASHVILI, AKEHURST’S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 91 (Alexander Orakhelashvili ed., 8th ed. 2018).   
 95  See Math Noortmann, Transnational Law: Philip Jessup’s Legacy and Beyond, in 
NON-STATE ACTOR IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 57, 63 (Noortmann et al. eds., 2001). 
 96  Karsten Nowrot, New Approaches to the International Legal Personality of 
Multinational Corporations: Towards a Rebuttable Presumption of Normative 
Responsibilities, 9 J. GLOB. LEGAL STUD. 1, 3 (1993). 
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protection of human rights, the environment, and core labor and social 
standards.”97  Others propose a reevaluation of the structure of international 
law and departure from the formalistic doctrines of subjects and legal 
personality altogether: “The new actors in our globalizing world might 
more easily be molded into the system of international law if we try to 
conceive of them as factors and forces of a broader constitutional order.”98  
In this constitutionalist perspective, states no longer have a law making 
monopoly but instead are participants in a larger spectrum of actors 
involved.  A third approach attempts to revise the notion of international 
legal personality based on cosmopolitan and hermeneutic theories.99  It 
argues that individuals possess “a natural right to political participation 
[and] the right to have rights, [which] includes the right to live in a world 
governed by just institutions[.]”100  It posits that the notions of “subjects” 
and “legal personality” in international law are changing and non-state 
actors have a “natural right to political participation”101 or “at least a 
legitimate expectation” to a “general right to participate in international 
legal discourse.”102 
Notwithstanding the growing recognition of non-state actors, legal 
doctrine still considers international law making as an essential prerogative 
of states, and states as the sole “subjects” of international law for its 
purposes.103  The gap between legal formalism and the normative activism 
of non-state actors including their growing international privileges and 
expectations remains and increases.104  According to Charlesworth and 
Chinkin,  the reason is that these actors “are often considered part of the 
 
 97  Bianchi, supra note 86, at 43. 
 98  Daniel Thürer, The Emergence of Non-Governmental Organizations and 
Transnational Enterprises in International Law and the Changing Role of the State, in NON-
STATE ACTORS AS NEW SUBJECTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 37, 74 (Rainer Hofmann & Nils 
Geissler eds., 1999).  
 99  JANNE ELISABETH NIJMAN, THE CONCEPT OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PERSONALITY: 
AN INQUIRY INTO THE HISTORY AND THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 472–73 (2004). 
 100  Id. at 472.  
 101  Id. at 473; see also Steve Charnovitz, The Emergence of Democratic Participation in 
Global Governance, 10 IND. J. GLOB. LEGAL STUD. 45 (2003). 
 102  ANNA-KARIN LINDBLOM, NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 526 (2005). 
 103  INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, FIRST REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE: NON-STATE 
ACTORS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: AIMS, APPROACH AND SCOPE OF PROJECT AND LEGAL 
ISSUES 655 (2010); see, for an anthology of international legal personality, Fleur E. Johns, 
International Legal Personality (Sydney Law Sch., Res. Paper No. 09/113, 2009), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1487383. 
 103  Noortmann, supra note 95, at 71. 
 103  HILARY CHARLESWORTH & CHRISTINE CHINKIN, THE BOUNDARIES OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW: A FEMINIST ANALYSIS 31 (2000). 
 104  Noortmann, supra note 95, at 71. 
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‘private’ within the international legal arenas and part of the ‘public’ in the 
domestic fora.”105  But they equally acknowledge that the “location [of 
non-state actors] at the intersection between public and private spheres 
illustrates the changing boundaries of International Law.”106  This tension 
between the existing largely formalistic legal framework and the growing 
factual reality has been further complicated by questions of legitimacy, 
accountability, and a lack of democratic deficit of non-state actors.107  
While these objections are not necessarily without merit, they creep in due 
to lack of a more systematic representation and understanding of 
international law making that incorporates these actors and traces their 
effect.  I propose instead that seeing international law making processes 
through the networks that facilitate them will allow us to map the actors 
involved, trace their effect, understand their synergies, and facilitate a 
framework that is a measured reflection of international law making today. 
2. Questions of Legitimacy 
In addition to the changing role of state and non-state actors in 
international law, there are also theoretical and methodological concerns 
regarding any inclusion of non-state actors in international law making.  
These concerns involve: (1) whether the state is the only legitimate 
international law actor; (2) if not, whether non-state actors possess the 
sufficient elements to be considered legitimate; and (3) whether they can be 
held accountable for their practice.108  Even though the debates on the 
nature and meaning of the term “legitimacy” are a long and arduous matter, 
we generally understand legitimacy as either a social concept or a 
normative concept.  As a social matter, to be legitimate means to be 
accepted and recognized.  As a normative matter, it means to be worthy of 
being recognized.109  The two concepts are analytically and conceptually 
independent.  For instance, the adoption of a standard such as the exclusion 
of women from voting may be socially legitimate if all members of a 
society recognize it as such.  It would be normatively legitimate only if it 
conforms with currently accepted civil and human rights standards. 
There are two main ways of assessing normative legitimacy.  
According to the more utilitarian “outcome legitimacy,” the more effective 
an actor or a circumstance is at delivering outcomes that are satisfactory to 
 
 105  CHARLESWORTH & CHINKIN, supra note 103.   
 106  Id. 
 107  Pollack & Shaffer, supra note 68, at 243. 
 108   INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, supra note 103, at 645. 
 109 Anne Peters et al., Towards Non-State Actors as Effective, Legitimate and 
Accountable Standard Setters, in NON-STATE ACTORS AS STANDARD SETTERS 492, 511 
(Anne Peters et al. eds., 2009). 
BANTEKA (DO NOT DELETE) 11/14/2019  5:19 PM 
2019] A NETWORK THEORY APPROACH 359 
the greater amount of people, the more legitimate they are.110  On the other 
hand, “process legitimacy” attaches itself to the means through which these 
outcomes are achieved irrespective of their end quality; in other words 
whether the processes are fair, transparent, and accountable.111  Typically, 
non-state actors receive attacks on both these legitimacy counts.  Non-state 
actors exercising governance functions often trigger questions of 
transparency or accessibility when juxtaposed to elected government.112  
The relative flexibility and informality of their operations suggests, for 
some, that they do not fall under the same constraints imposed on more 
“formal” types of governance, including standards and procedures.113 
Is there merit to these attacks?  I think the answer is yes, in part.  But 
we may resolve these legitimacy issues without abandoning attention on 
the undoubted involvement of non-state actors in international law and 
international law making.  Many legitimacy objections over non-state actor 
participation are based on traditional, vertical, state-centric views of the 
international system.  States are able to control the extent and quality of 
non-state actor participation in their constituencies, expand or restrict it at 
will, while exercising and maintaining their full traditional sovereignty.114  
The limited role carved out for non-state actors may well stem from 
transposing a legitimacy model that belongs to hierarchical legal and 
political structures into a more mixed and increasingly horizontal 
international landscape.  Such an approach effectively attempts to draw an 
analogy between systems that, at least for purposes of legitimacy, are 
fundamentally distinct. 
But even if we were to accept, for the sake of the argument, that, 
currently, non-state actors are treated under the correct legitimacy standard, 
the question remains: do we hold non-state actors to the same legitimacy 
requirements to which we hold the rest of the international system?  
Andrew Moravcisk has argued that it is important not to impose more rigid 
legitimacy requirements on non-state actors than we do on states.115  While 
non-state actors are often attacked for legitimacy gaps because they are 
compared to idealized democratic systems and formalistic notions of 
 
 110  Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Power and Legitimacy of Government Networks, in 
SOCIETY FOR INTERNATIONAL DIALOGUE, THE PARTNERSHIP PRINCIPLE, NEW FORMS OF 
GOVERNANCE IN THE 21ST CENTURY 7 (2004).  
 111  Id. 
 112  Id. 
 113  Id.  
 114  See Asher Alkoby, Non-State Actors and the Legitimacy of International 
Environmental Law, 3 NON-STATE ACTORS INT’L L. 23, 70, 88–89 (2003). 
 115  Andrew Moravcisk, Is There a “Democratic Deficit” in World Politics? A 
Framework for Analysis, 39 GOV’T & OPPOSITION 336, 337 (2004). 
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legitimacy, we do not often hold states to such standards in practice.116  
Where states do not live up to their expected legitimacy standards, holding 
non-state actors against idealized forms of state governance instead of “real 
world” standards may seem, in itself, rather “illegitimate.” 
To examine non-state actors’ outcome legitimacy, it is helpful to ask 
why non-state actors get involved in international relations in the first 
place?  In established systems, new actors emerge when there is need for 
political authority and private regulation, and an empty institutional space 
to fill.117  In such “institutional voids,” the roles, expectations, and 
objectives of agencies are unclear, and private action comes in to resolve 
the need for regulation, and to increase clarity and transparency.118  These 
institutional voids may be intended or unintended.119  States may 
deliberately cease certain fields and leave it to private actors to fill in the 
gap, or the gap may be the result of unintended independent processes that 
create a demand for additional regulation states can’t immediately 
deliver.120 
Authority issues aside, the practical reality of non-state actors has 
overcome prior reflection.121  These actors operate in the international 
sphere, shape agendas, and participate in international law making 
processes.  Their legitimacy is largely tied with their efficacy and outcome.  
These non-state actors even go beyond the reach of states in certain aspects 
by effecting change and creating new models for behavior, like determining 
new standards and policies in human rights, or proposing new 
environmental regulations.122  Non-state actors’ involvement in 
humanitarian activities has led to the adoption of more and better 
humanitarian law and policies by states.123  As non-state actors involvement 
in international law making increases, the level of closed-door diplomacy 
decreases, making these processes more transparent.  Non-state actors 
increasingly hold specialized knowledge due to their often-singular 
 
 116  Id.  
 117  See Bas Arts, Non-State Actors in Global Governance: Three Faces of Power, 
2003/4 PREPRINTS AUS DER MAX-PLANCK-PROJEKTGRUPPE RECHT DER 
GEMEINSCHAFTSGÜETER 34 (2003). 
 118  See Maarten Hajer, Policy Without Policy? Policy Analysis and the Institutional 
Void, 36 POL’Y SCI. 175, 181 (2003). 
 119  Arts, supra note 117.   
 120  Arts, supra note 117, at 34.  
 121  See Richard Langhorne, The Diplomacy of Non-State Actors, 16 DIPL. & 
STATECRAFT 331, 331 (2005).  
 122  See generally Kristine Kern & Harriet Bulkeley, Cities, Europeanization and Multi-
Level Governance: Governing Climate Change Through Transnational Municipal 
Networks, 47 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 309, 309 (2009).  
 123  See Cenap Cakmak, Civil Society Actors in International Law and World Politics: 
Definition, Conceptual Framework, Problems, 6 INT’L J. CIV. SOC’Y L. 7, 30 (2008). 
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grassroots experience and relationship to the conditions affecting 
communities on the ground.124  This unique perspective renders non-state 
actors crucial for holding governments accountable.125  This is particularly 
evident on issues of economic development, environmental protection, or 
civilian protection from certain categories of weapons such as 
antipersonnel landmines.126  Insofar as these non-state actors efficiently fill 
in the intended or unintended public authority and regulation gaps of the 
state, they gain outcome legitimacy. 
It is true that the justification for non-state actors’ exercise of 
governance has been “primarily if not exclusively instrumental.”127  Non-
state actors demonstrate that they can provide “benefits that cannot 
otherwise be obtained.”128  Brunkhorst argues that non-state actors may 
make legitimacy claims based on outcome legitimacy “through the positive 
effect [they have] for the people or peoples of the world,” but they lack 
process legitimacy due to their lack of democratic participation and 
control.129  What is more, non-state actor involvement in international 
decision-making has increased the level of scrutiny applied to their process 
legitimacy.  But how do we evaluate this legitimacy? 
The way non-state actors operate and manage themselves, including 
their relationship with their constituencies are factors that would normally 
apply towards their process legitimacy.130  But unlike democratic states, 
non-state actors have no electoral mandate and thus have not been 
legitimated by those over whom they claim to exercise political authority.  
 
 124  See Tim Büthe, Governance Through Private Authority: Non-State Actors in World 
Politics, 58 J. INT’L AFF. 281, 289 (2004). 
 125  Tim Büthe, Governance Through Private Authority: Non-State Actors in World 
Politics, 58 J. INT’L AFF. 281, 289 (2004). 
 126  See id.; Asher Alkoby, Non-State Actors and the Legitimacy of International 
Environmental Law, 3 NON-STATE ACTORS & INT’L L. 23, 33 (2003) (“By providing 
scientific expertise and by exercising their increasing political power, NGOs act to shape the 
global environmental agenda.  Lack of information and scientific uncertainty often become 
barriers to global efforts to combat environmental degradation.  This is why in recent years, 
NGOs have had the opportunity to play an important role in the processes that led to many 
of the conferences where international environmental treaties were negotiated and signed.”); 
id. at 26 (“Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), business corporations and other non-
state entities have become increasingly influential in international environmental lawmaking 
processes.  They initiate international action to address environmental concerns; influence 
the negotiating process of treaties and other legal instruments, and help monitor state 
compliance with international norms.  Yet they are usually not afforded legal status, and 
their roles are generally not secured in international institutional arrangements.”). 
 127  Allen Buchanan & Robert O. Keohane, The Legitimacy of Global Governance 
Institutions, 20 ETHICS & INT’L AFFAIRS 405, 422 (2006).  
 128  Id. 
 129   Peters et al., supra note 109, at 225. 
 130  Matthew Bolton & Thomas Nash, The Role of Middle Power-NGO Coalitions in 
Global Policy: The Case of the Cluster Munitions Ban, 1 GLOBAL POL’Y 172, 181 (2010).  
BANTEKA (DO NOT DELETE) 11/14/2019  5:19 PM 
362 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:339 
This objection became known as the “global democratic deficit” of non-
state actors notably after the 1999 Ministerial Conference of the World 
Trade Organization when the “international system’s lack of transparency, 
accountability, and citizen inclusiveness became a major political issue.”131  
This largely shared notion of democratic legitimacy often presumes that the 
legitimacy of a government and the legitimacy of a non-state actor are of 
the same kind and attach to the same type of relations with their 
constituencies. However, the expression of constituencies’ support is 
different towards governments and non-state actors.  While governments 
receive their public support through elections, public support for non-state 
actors may be demonstrated through other forms of participation such as 
membership, voluntary work, endorsement of their strategies and causes, 
financial donations, or even social media following.  The origin of such 
legitimacy thus differs and attaches to the authority the non-state actor 
exerts based on their perceived ability to address a certain type of 
institutional void through its specialized knowledge and expertise, or its 
exemplary principles and values.132 
In a world where non-state actors de facto exercise political authority, 
“there is a direct relationship between the relevant global governance 
institution and the actors to whom the normative provision is addressed.”133  
This not only suggests that non-state actors derive their legitimacy from 
their position in the global governance system, but also that the system 
itself derives its legitimacy from the link these non-state actors establish 
between its institutions and their constituency.134  This legitimacy must be 
offered voluntarily; non-state actors cannot force it but rather attract or 
inspire it.  Their legitimacy will then depend on the period they are capable 
of retaining the constituency support, which is not guaranteed for a specific 
time unlike that of the elected government.  When the non-state actors lose 
this support, they then suffer a democratic deficit and cease to be 
legitimate. 
3. Questions of Accountability 
As non-state actors gain more significant institutional power, a natural 
question lingers: to whom are they accountable?135  Just like legitimacy, 
accountability is also a relational concept that is socially and discursively 
 
 131  Andrew L. Strauss, Considering Global Democracy - An Introduction to the 
Symposium: Envisioning a More Democratic Global System, 13 WIDENER L. REV. [i], [i] 
(2007). 
 132  DEBORAH D. AVANT ET AL., WHO GOVERNS THE GLOBE? 114 (Deborah D. Avant et 
al. eds., 2010). 
 133  Peters et al., supra note 109, at 232. 
 134  Arts, supra note 117, at 34. 
 135  Büthe, supra note 126, at 289.  
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constituted.  Edwards and Hume define it as “the means by which 
individuals and organizations report to a recognized authority (or 
authorities) and are held responsible for their actions.”136  Other scholars 
expand this perspective by proposing that accountability is not only about 
being “held responsible” by others, but also about “taking responsibility” 
for oneself.137  This gives accountability two forms, one external as “an 
obligation to meet prescribed standards of behavior,”138 and one internal as 
“felt responsibility.”139  The objection that non-state actors’ increasing 
influence is disproportionate because of their lack of accountability is an 
objection to the role of non-state actors in international law processes.  In 
assessing this objection, framing is of the essence.  The answer to the 
question, “are non-state actors currently adequately accountable?”, the 
answer is, likely no.  But in a world where the role of these actors is not 
only identified but also understood, the important question to ask is, “can 
non-state actors become adequately accountable, and how?”  This is not to 
diminish the importance of the accountability critique but to frame the 
debate in a more constructive manner. 
The earlier “subjects doctrine” issue also speaks to accountability.  
Even though non-state actors are granted key roles within legal and 
legislative arrangements, their official status under international law 
remains uncertain.  These actors are still relatively undiscovered since 
states “have not yet agreed on a standard for NGOs [and other non-state 
actors] operating in the transnational sphere.”140  But the landscape for non-
state actor accountability isn’t as blurry as it may seem.  The ILC has 
adopted the Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations 
(RIO)141 setting new baselines regarding wrongful actions,142 consequences 
and standards of attribution,143 and reparation.144  The progress made in the 
International Organizations sphere suggests that accountability deserves 
greater significance and can be fleshed out with the necessary political will 
 
 136  Michael Edwards & David Hulme, Too Close for Comfort? The Impact of Official 
Aid on Nongovernmental Organizations, 24 WORLD DEV. 961, 967 (1996). 
 137  Andrea Cornwall et al., Accountability Through Participation: Developing Workable 
Partnership Models in the Health Sector, 31 INST. DEV. STUD. BULL. 1, 3 (2000). 
 138  Laura B. Chisolm, Accountability of Nonprofit Organizations and Those Who 
Control Them: The Legal Framework, 6 NONPROFIT MGMT. & LEADERSHIP 141, 141 (1995).  
 139  Ronald E. Fry, Accountability in Organizational Life: Problem or Opportunity for 
Nonprofits?, 6 NONPROFIT MGMT. & LEADERSHIP 181, 181 (1995).  
 140  Kerstin Martens, Examining the (Non-)Status of NGOs in International Law, 10 IND. 
J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 1, 23 (2003).  
 141   Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Third Session, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.4/SER.A/2011/Add.1 (Part 2), at 40 (2011). 
 142   Id. at Art. 3. 
 143   Id. at Art. 6–9. 
 144   Id. at 42, Art. 31. 
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and right approach. 
NGOs have encountered similar demands for accountability 
particularly after the Greenpeace-Brent Spar incident.  There, Greenpeace 
was criticized for significantly overstating the potential environmental 
damage of the Brent Spar oilrig sinking in the North Sea based on a prior 
environmental impact assessment.145  Greenpeace was successful in 
convincing Shell to dismantle the oilrig on land but it was later discovered 
that sinking it would have been a safer and more environmentally friendly 
option.146  This episode not only bruised the credibility and reputation of 
Greenpeace but also opened up the debate for NGOs’ liability under 
international law.  On the other hand, the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) has successfully developed a 
“code of conduct,” which includes guidelines on “etiquette, safety, and 
participation in meetings” within its “constituency” system for NGOs.147  
Despite this development, NGOs, like most other non-state actors, do not 
generally incur legal liability for their actions on the international sphere.148 
But one may question whether the same type of legal liability is in 
fact a possible or even desirable form of accountability, given the nature of 
the services and operations some non-state actors provide as public-good 
entities, and the possible “unrecoverable costs caused by their resistance 
action.”149  This does not mean that NGOs and other non-state actors 
should evade all kinds of accountability towards the public, themselves, 
and their members.  Most public institutions are held to a set of standards, 
which may also extend to non-state actors.  Accountability mechanisms that 
are already in use and can be extended or institutionalized such as reports 
and disclosure statements, evaluations, performance assessments, self-
 
 145  See generally INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, supra note 103. 
 146  See, for an account of the episode: GRANT JORDAN, SHELL, GREENPEACE AND THE 
BRENT SPAR 12 (2001).  Greenpeace still defends that recycling was the best option.  See 
1995 - Shell Reverses Decision to Dump the Brent Spar, GREENPEACE INT’L, 
https://www.greenpeace.org/archive-international/en/about/history/Victories-timeline/Brent-
Spar/ (last visited Oct. 15, 2019).  Sinking would, amongst others, be environmentally 
friendly, in that it enables coral growth on the decommissioned oil rigs.  See Niall Bell & 
Jan Smith, Coral Growing on North Sea Oil Rights, 402 NATURE 601, 601 (1999). 
 147  UNITED NATIONS CLIMATE CHANGE SECRETARIAT, GUIDELINES FOR THE 
PARTICIPATION OF REPRESENTATIVES OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS AT 
MEETINGS OF THE BODIES OF THE UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE 
CHANGE 1, 2–5 (Mar. 2003).  See BARBARA K. WOODWARD, GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAWMAKING AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: THEORY AND PRACTICE 311 
(2010). 
 148  RAINER HOFMANN & NILS GEISSLER, NON-STATE ACTORS AS NEW SUBJECTS OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 81 (1999).  
 149  REPHAEL HAREL BEN-ARI, THE LEGAL STATUS OF INTERNATIONAL NON-
GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS: ANALYSIS OF PAST AND PRESENT INITIATIVES (1912-2012) 
60 (2013). 
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regulation, and social audits are different types of accountability 
mechanisms that may better fit the different qualities of non-state actors.  In 
the event that these actors fail to meet their standards, they may become 
subject to sanctions, such as the shrinking size of their membership or 
support base, the reduction of their financial resources, the shaming and 
attack on their reputation in the eyes of their peers and public opinion, and 
decreased media attention and exposure.150  The Global Accountability 
Index is one of the relatively new initiatives that measures and compares 
the accountability of transnational actors including non-state actors based 
on their transparency, evaluation, participation, and complaint response 
mechanisms.151  Empirically measuring accountability helps shift the 
debate into the right direction, from a purely theoretical one to that of 
tangible analysis and effect.  Like the legitimacy objection, the 
accountability skepticism is certainly present and valid.  Instead of 
discounting non-state actors and their involvement altogether, however, the 
more constructive shift is to assess how and in what forms accountability 
may expand to them. 
III. MANNERS OF CONNECTION IN NETWORKS 
A. Short Introduction to Network Theory and Analysis 
To establish the framework and the tools that allow us to see 
international law differently, we need a different kind of perspective and a 
new methodological approach.  The first step we took to this end was to 
undertake a conceptual shift regarding the kind of structures in which 
contemporary international law making takes place.  The previous part 
prepared us to view the international system as a web of multiple actors and 
networks instead of only states as unitary hierarchical actors.  In this world, 
the development of international law is not limited to the boundaries of 
sovereign power but depends upon the connection, density, and intensity of 
ties across these boundaries, and among actors.152  To achieve this shift of 
our perspective and analysis, this part sets up the methodological 
framework within which we can examine networks as structures in and of 
themselves, but also networks as actors in a larger international networked 
system.153  That is because agency and structure are viewed as deeply 
intertwined and interdependent.  Giddens describes this interdependence as 
the duality of structure, “according to [which] the structural properties of 
 
 150  Peter Grabosky, Beyond Responsive Regulation: The Expanding Role of Non-State 
Actors in the Regulatory Process, 7 REG. & GOVERNANCE 114, 119 (2013).  
 151  Peters et al., supra note 109, at 279. 
 152  See Bianchi, supra note 86, at 41 n.7. 
 153  SLAUGHTER, supra note 71, at 34.  
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social systems are both medium and outcome of the practices they 
recursively organize.”154  Agency is bound by structures at the same time as 
agency brings about and changes those structures that determine the 
conditions of action.155  Analyzing networks of international law making as 
structures will help us assess how the structure of the network affects the 
actors within the international law making processes.  Examining networks 
as actors will shed light on the role and impact networks have on the 
making of international law when they interact with other actors or 
networks. 
Researchers across disciplines have, over the years, also developed a 
set of tools for understanding networks through analyzing and modeling 
them.  These tools are mathematical, statistical, and computational, and tell 
us something about a network that may not be visible to the naked eye.  In 
this Part, I will introduce the basic tools used to describe and analyze 
networks that can be helpful in the process of analyzing international 
legislative action.  Often, these tools start from a simple representation of 
the network and proceed with a series of calculations that answer different 
questions such as which actors are best connected, how actors cluster 
together, and even whether and how resources, information, or normative 
prescriptions emerge and diffuse in a network.  These tools exist in the 
abstract and may be applied to any system that we can represent in network 
form.  But not all of these tools are useful every time—rather, their 
usefulness is largely dependent on the network and specific questions the 
researcher poses.  What these measurements and calculations represent, 
however, is the available toolbox that we can use to address most enquiries 
in the process of understanding networks in general, and the networks 
involved in international law making in particular.  Most of these tools 
come from social network analysis and its application of graph theory, the 
branch of mathematics that addresses networks.156 
First, social network analysis is a collection of ideas, measures, and 
tools for relational analysis designed to understand the most important 
features of social structures.157  Researchers often use it to explore social 
relations and structures to better conceptualize and organize them but also 
to understand their material outcomes.158  The indispensable elements of all 
networks are actors with relations that represent any contact, connection, or 
 
 154  ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE CONSTITUTION OF SOCIETY 25 (1984). 
 155  See COLIN WIGHT, AGENTS, STRUCTURES AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: POLITICS 
AS ONTOLOGY 101 (2006). 
 156  See ALI KAVEH, OPTIMAL ANALYSIS OF STRUCTURES BY CONCEPTS OF SYMMETRY 
AND REGULARITY 15 (2013).  
 157  JOHN SCOTT, SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS: A HANDBOOK 85 (3d ed. 2017).  
 158  Id.   
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tie between any of at least two of them.159  Social network analysis focuses 
on these relationships as they are defined as links among certain nodes.  
After introducing the basics of social network analysis, I address its metrics 
for quantifying network structure and discuss some of the most relevant 
patterns that networks reveal when we apply these social network analysis 
metrics to the study of networks in international law making. 
Second, graph theory comes in to analyze and visualize these 
connections.  Graphs are the mathematical structures used to portray 
pairwise relations between actors.160  Remember the seven bridges of the 
Koningsberg problem?  Well, graph theory has made leaps and bounds 
since Euler’s graph assisted with this problem’s solution.  The main 
advantage of graphs is their powerful way of representing structured 
data.161  Graph visualizations thus represent the nodes and links of a 
network in a way that promotes easier understanding of the structures and 
relationships represented by the graph.  Graph theory will help us transform 
our multi-dimensional world and its phenomena into a two-dimensional 
graph of nodes (actors) and edges (links), to quantify these relationships, 
and to formalize their properties through algorithms.  This Article only 
includes a fraction of graph theory’s tools, focusing on the ones that are 
most relevant to the study of networks responsible for the making of 
international law.  Seeing this different perspective of the world allows us 
to understand the wide spectrum of actors, structures, and designs involved 
in international law making today. 
Sociologists first used social network analysis to explain social 
behavior by examining the structural patterns of community ties, 
hypothesizing that these patterns determined the social behavior of the 
actors involved.162  Social network analysis undertakes as the primary unit 
of inquiry the social relation that connects members in a social system 
instead of the agents themselves.  It is grounded on the intuitive idea that 
the patterns of social ties that actors are embedded in have important 
consequences for those actors, and are able to shape their perceptions, 
attitudes, and actions.163  Wasserman and Faust have proposed the four 
 
 159  DAVID KNOKE & SONG YANG, SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS 6–7 (2d ed. 2008). 
 160  FABRIZIO DE VICO FALLANI & FABIO BABILONI, THE GRAPH THEORETICAL APPROACH 
IN BRAIN FUNCTIONAL NETWORKS: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 13 (2010). 
 161  Horst Bunke & Michel Neuhaus, Graph Matching—Exact and Error-Tolerant 
Methods and the Automatic Learning of Edit Costs, in MINING GRAPH DATA 17, 17 (Diane J. 
Cook & Lawrence B. Holder eds., 2006). 
 162  Barry Wellman, Studying Personal Communities, in SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND 
NETWORK ANALYSIS 61, 63–64 (Peter V. Marsden & Nan Lin eds., 1982). 
 163  Linton C. Freeman, The Development of Social Network Analysis: A Study in the 
Sociology of Science, 27 SOC. NETWORKS 377 (2005); KNOKE & YANG, supra note 159, at 
63–64. 
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broadly accepted principles of social network analysis:164 (1) the agents and 
their actions are not autonomous or independent but rather 
interdependent;165 (2) the ties between nodes are the channels through 
which material or non-material resources flow;166 (3) the structures of the 
network may constrain or enable agents’ individual action;167 and (4) 
network structures may be studied as long-term patterns among the 
individual nodes.168  This framework allows for an empirical calculation of 
the relationships involved, a mapping of these relationships on the basis of 
connection, a tangible display of the effects these relationships produce 
within and for the network, and an evaluation of the network structure as a 
whole.169 
Perhaps the most important benefit of social networks analysis is its 
ability to escape the narrow vision of the actor-centered analysis we often 
encounter in international law.  Instead of focusing only on the attributes of 
a single actor or a given number of actors, it targets the associations among 
these actors,170 and their ability to enable or constrain agents.171  In this 
way, social network analysis complements already existing methods by 
offering an additional lens that focuses on actors’ associations.  By 
proposing that patterned relations among actors influence social entities 
beyond their individual attributes, social network analysis can infuse a 
theoretical framework with an empirical basis for the sources and effects of 
social action, including that leading to international law making.172  By 
making use of statistical analysis and applying the quantitative tools of 
linear algebra and graph theory to the identification of organizational 
structures and their effects,173 social network analysis exposes our 
framework for understanding international law making to an entirely new 
dimension. 
 
 164  STANLEY WASSERMAN & KATHERINE FAUST, SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS: METHODS 
AND APPLICATIONS 4, 8 (2004).  
 165  Id.; see also Hafner-Burton et al., supra note 88, at 562; Scott D. Gest & Thomas A. 
Kindermann, Analysis of Static Social Networks and Their Developmental Effects, in 
HANDBOOK OF DEVELOPMENTAL RESEARCH METHODS 577, 580 (Brett Laursen et al. eds., 
2012).  
 166  WASSERMAN & FAUST, supra note 164, at 4; Wellman, supra note 162; Hafner-
Burton et al., supra note 88, at 562.  
 167   WASSERMAN & FAUST, supra note 164, at 4; Wellman, supra note 162; Hafner-
Burton et al., supra note 88, at 562.  
 168   WASSERMAN & FAUST, supra note 164, at 4; Wellman, supra note 162; Hafner-
Burton et al., supra note 88, at 562.  
 169  Hafner-Burton et al., supra note 88, at 562–63. 
 170  Hafner-Burton et al., supra note 88, at 562. 
 171  Hafner-Burton et al., supra note 88, at 560.  
 172  IAN MCCULLOH ET AL., SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS WITH APPLICATIONS 13 (2013).  
 173  Id.   
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But just like all research methods, social network analysis has its 
limitations.  Its primary limitation stems from the realization that the social 
and, by extension, the legal worlds, consist of more than just social 
structures.174  Social network analysis is constrained to addressing 
structural relations.175  Yet many of the issues that relate to the study of 
social action require an additional set of analytical tools to address aspects 
that are not as easily quantifiable.  For example, intention, rationality, or 
subjectivity within social environments may influence networks, but these 
factors are more difficult for social network analysis to assess alone.176  But 
even though social network analysis has some analytical limitations, it is 
open to complement and be complemented by other differently limited 
approaches.177  Because of its generality and flexibility, social network 
analysis can cut across the boundaries of traditional discipline distinction 
without becoming antagonistic with other disciplines or methods.178  For 
instance, as social network analysis does not have data collection methods 
specific to it, it borrows data collection methodologies from other 
disciplines.179  This disciplinary fluidity and the versatility of its methods 
and tools allow social network analysis to address some of the most 
complex aspects of social structure and the attributes of individual actors 
that arise from their relations with others.180 
In social sciences, social network analysis has become a strong 
methodology that complements standard statistical analysis.  It has been 
defined, applied, and tested in several research fields from anthropology 
and sociology to organizational behavior and history.181  An “organized 
 
 174  JOHN SCOTT, WHAT IS SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS? 85 (2012).  
 175  See David Knoke & Song Yang, SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS 4–6 (2008).  
 176  SCOTT, supra note 174; See e.g.,  Dharshana Kasthurirathna, Michael Harre, and 
Mahendra Piraveenan, Influence modelling using bounded rationality in social networks, in 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2015 IEEE/ACM INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ADVANCES IN 
SOCIAL NETWORKS ANALYSIS AND MINING 2015 33–4 (Jian Pei, Fabrizio Silvestri, and Jie 
Tang eds. 2015).  
 177   SCOTT, supra note 174, at 86; See generally KNOKE & YANG, supra note 159. 
 178  LINTON C. FREEMAN, THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS 4 (2004) 
(“The network field has developed important applications in research on: ‘. . . the study of 
occupational mobility, the impact of urbanization on individuals, the world political and 
economic system, community decision-making, social support, community, group problem-
solving, diffusion, corporate interlocking, belief systems, social cognition, markets, 
sociology of science, exchange and power, consensus and social influence, and coalition 
formation . . . primate studies, computer-mediated communication, intra- and inter-
organizational studies, and marketing . . . health and illness, particularly AIDS.’”). 
 179  Stephen T. Ricken et al., Tell Us Who: Guided Social Network Data Collection, 
PROC. 43RD HAWAII INT’L CONF. SYS. SCI. 1 (2010). 
 180  Robert Hanneman & Mark Riddle, Centrality and Power, INTRODUCTION TO SOC. 
NETWORK METHODS (2005), https://faculty.ucr.edu/~hanneman/nettext/. 
 181  AJITH ABRAHAM ET AL., COMPUTATIONAL SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS: TRENDS, 
TOOLS AND RESEARCH ADVANCES 135 (2009).   
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paradigm” for a social network analysis enquiry includes an initial 
structural intuition based on relations that link actors, a strong set of 
empirical data, reliance on mathematical and computational models, 
development of graphic imagery and its analysis through visualization.182  
In social network analysis, regardless of whether one is collecting data on 
larger or smaller networks, one must specify a “boundary” that establishes 
which actors and relations are included within the network and which ones 
are excluded.183  Without this boundary specification, particularly in larger 
networks, the number of possible links could increase exponentially as the 
number of actors increases.  This could threaten to both outstrip the ability 
of the researcher to collect all necessary data and, in particularly large 
networks, the ability of the hardware and software to process this data 
computationally. 
B. Why International Law, Why Now? 
What do these methods have to offer to international law making?  
First, the tools of network theory help us quantify and map actors’ and 
networks’ contributions to international legislative processes.  This 
descriptive project allows us to clearly map and understand the wide 
spectrum of actors, structures, and designs involved in international law 
making.  It provides a means to quantify the impact and effect of these 
actors individually and collectively on the making of international law 
irrespective of their de jure status in international legislative action and 
fora.  In other words, this allows us to map states and non-state actors and 
investigate their actual, instead of expected, contribution to international 
legislative processes.  Finally, network theory can help us to tailor 
networked solutions to existing international problems so that international 
legislative action can be more effective. 
International law addresses problems that have triggered international 
legislative action requiring coordination, collaboration, regulation, 
allocation of resources, responsiveness to threats against the network and 
the network’s actors, as well as means of normative enforcement and 
accountability.  Network theory will help us map and examine the types of 
networks that emerge to address these problems through international 
legislative action, allowing us to recognize the full spectrum of actors 
involved in international law making and their precise effect.  This will 
offer an empirical basis for current discussions on the role of various actors 
in international law, including their normative contribution and effect as 
well as their levels of de facto recognition by other actors of the 
 
 182  FREEMAN, supra note 178, at 3. 
 183  Edward O. Laumann et al., The Boundary Specification Problem in Network 
Analysis, in RESEARCH METHODS IN SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS 61 (1989).  
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international system.  Thus, these methods make descriptive analytical 
contributions to international law. 
These methods also serve a more prescriptive analytical function for 
international law.  A key question in the study of networks in international 
law is whether and under what terms networks are more effective at 
addressing problems through legislative processes than the other two 
existing structural forms of markets and hierarchies.184  Network analysis 
not only allows us to measure and map the dynamics of actors in networks 
but also provides the springboard on which to build new frameworks for 
international legislative action.  Network analysis paints a much clearer 
picture of whom to call upon when putting forward a legislative agenda, 
when to introduce a normative prescription on the basis of the legislative 
network’s social capital,185 and how to best diffuse it based on the actors 
involved in each legislative process.  Network analysis also helps us 
determine the most powerful actors or the leaders in various legislative 
networks, and to quantify the effect of their position to normative 
development.  Finally, network analysis allows us to map how actors 
influence each other’s normative preferences and outcomes, the preferences 
and outcomes of their networks and other networks, how these actors are 
likely to act based on the structures they are embedded in, and what they 
learn from each other.  Understanding and integrating these insights is 
critical to mapping existing international legislative action and prescribing 
the means to enact successful international legislative action in the future. 
And why use these methods in international law now?  For decades, 
quantitative methods in international law boiled down to some primary 
datasets collected in the field of human rights and analyzed statistically 
from print or analogue datasets.186  This was, in part, due to the scarcity of 
data and the difficulties of obtaining it at the time, and, in part, due to the 
narrower approach of traditional legal method.  But data today has become 
an increasingly important driver of empirical legal research.  The catch-all 
term “big data” refers to the exponential growth of available data as a 
product of increasing connectivity through the digital revolution.187  
 
 184  See Slaughter, supra note 71, at 36. 
 185  See generally JOHN SCOTT, SOCIAL NETWORKS: CRITICAL CONCEPTS IN SOCIOLOGY 
103 (2002); see generally JAMES S. COLEMAN, FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL THEORY (1990). 
 186  Antoine Nouvet & Frederic Megret, Quantitative Methods for Human Rights: From 
Statistics to “Big Data”, RES. METHODOLOGIES LEGAL HUM. RTS. SCHOLARSHIP (2017). 
 187  Various strict quantitative definitions exist (for example: a dataset with over a billion 
data nodes).  Various qualitative definitions exist (such as the dataset’s approximation to 
capturing the entire data population we intend to measure, or the inability for typical 
database software tools to process data because it is too large, unstructured, and complex.  
This chapter emphasizes the importance of the digital.  This is similar with the UN 
OHCHR’s definition: “Extremely large data sets associated with new information 
technology and which can be analyzed computationally to reveal possible patterns, trends 
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Conceptually, big data in legal research is associated with three primary 
factors:  First, the levels of connectivity and information diffusion through 
the internet have dramatically increased.  Next, more than ever before, the 
advancements in search engines and creation of big databases and 
repositories are at the disposal of legal scholars.  That is why researchers 
are beginning to become increasingly aware of their ability to treat primary 
material in the legal discipline as data.  Finally, the increased interaction of 
international law with other disciplines provides international law 
researchers with new sets of methods and tools for processing large 
amounts of data, and introduces new approaches to legal enquiry that were 
less attractive in the past due to scarcity of such data or decreased ability to 
process it. 
1. The Basic Network Properties 
In the previous part, a network was defined as a collection of actors 
called nodes connected by links of relations called edges.  When 
researchers represent networks in Figures, like Figure 1 below, circles 
represent nodes and lines connecting circles represent edges.  A network is 
also called a “graph” in the language of mathematics.  Mathematically, I 
will abbreviate a graph 𝐺 as 𝐺 = (𝑉, 𝐸), where 𝑉 is the set of nodes and 𝐸 
is the set of edges.  Then |𝑉| is the total number of nodes, and |𝐸| is the 
total number of edges in the graph 𝐺.  If 𝑢 and 𝑣 are two nodes belonging 
to graph 𝐺, and there is an edge from 𝑢 to 𝑣, then I write that (𝑢, 𝑣) ∈ 𝐸, 
and say that 𝑣 is a neighbor of 𝑢.  For simplicity, I write (𝑢, 𝑣) to represent 
the link between 𝑢 and 𝑣, and also write (𝑢, 𝑣) ∈ 𝐺 to indicate that u and v 




and correlations.”  A Human Rights-Based Approach to Data, UNITED NATIONS HUMAN 
RIGHTS OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER (2018), 
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/HRIndicators/GuidanceNoteonApproachtoData.p
df. 
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There are many ways to mathematically represent a network.  
Consider the network in Figure 1 above.  It has a given number of nodes 
that is 𝑛 =  5.  If we denote an edge between nodes 1 and 3 by (1,3) then 
we can describe the complete network by giving the specific number of 
nodes and a list of all edges.  In the network above this is 𝑛 =  5 nodes and 
edges (1,3), (2,3), (3,4), (3,5), and (4,5).  This representation of the edges 
is called an “edge list” and is useful in storing the data of a network to 
further analyze computationally.  Networks may be directed or undirected 
depending on whether their edges are directed or undirected.  A directed 
edge means that the edge has an orientation that is typically represented by 
using an arrow in the graph.  In a directed graph, each edge has a certain 
direction pointing from one node to another node.  We may think of 
directed edges as one-way streets so when traversing a directed edge from 
node to node we must always travel down the edge as prescribed by the 
arrow direction.  Mathematically, a graph is directed if for any edge a,  
𝑎𝑢,𝑣 ≠ 𝑎𝑣,𝑢 and undirected if 𝑎𝑢,𝑣 = 𝑎𝑣,𝑢 for all 𝑢, 𝑣 ∈ |𝑉|.  Notice the 
difference between Figures 1 and 2.  Figure 2 below is a directed graph 
because the edges connecting its nodes indicate the direction with the 




Another way to represent a network is its adjacency matrix.  The 
adjacency matrix is a matrix that describes a graph by representing which 
nodes are adjacent to which other nodes in the graph.  Two nodes are 
adjacent if they are joined by an edge 𝑎.  A graph can then be described by 
its adjacency matrix 𝐴 = (𝑎𝑢,𝑣).  This is a square |𝑉| × |𝑉| matrix with 𝑉 
representing the number of nodes in the graph, where each row and column 
corresponds to a node of graph 𝐺.  In this matrix, 𝑎𝑢,𝑣 ∈ {0,1} represents 
the availability of an edge from node 𝑢 to node 𝑣.  To make the adjacency 
matrix of a graph we need to start by counting the number of nodes in the 
graph.  Let us take the undirected network in Figure 1 above again.  The 
graph has five nodes, so we need to make our adjacency matrix of size 5 by 
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5.  To make this clearer, we can put the names of the nodes on the top and 
side of the matrix: 
    1  2   3   4  5 
 






0   0   1   0   0   
 0   0   3   0   0    
 1   1   0   1   1   
 0   0   1   0   1   












Edges in a network represent the presence of a connection between 
nodes.  Absence of an edge also indicates absence of connection between 
two nodes.  In other words, either that connection exists, or it does not.  We 
represent this by giving these edges binary values based on connection or 
no connection between two nodes.  There are other instances, however, in 
which the connection itself can give us more information.  There is a way 
to represent edges as having a certain weight or value to them such as, for 
instance, the amount of data flowing within the edges of an internet 
network, or the frequency of telephone calls among friends in a social 
network.  In these cases, the edge weight 𝑎𝑢,𝑣 > 0 can take on non-binary 
values to represent the intensity of the interaction.  This means that a graph 
is a “weighted graph.”  In the adjacency matrix, we represent this feature 
by giving the elements of the matrix values beyond 0, 1 equal to the 
corresponding weight in the connection.  When we visualize a graph, we 
have additional means to represent these quantified variables.  In the 
instance of weight in a graph, we represent it by increasing or decreasing 
the size or intensity of the color of an edge connecting two nodes.  The 
larger or more intense the edge between two nodes, the higher the weight 
of that interaction.  Also, by extension, the larger or more intense the size 
or color of a node is, the higher the weight of that node. 
When two nodes are connected through a consecutive pair of edges, 
this represents a “path” in a network.  Paths are routes across the graph that 
run from node to node and represent at least a “two-edge sequence.”  In 
Figure 3, the bolder sequence of edges along four nodes represents a path. 
 
Figure 3 
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The adjacency matrix entries can tell us for every node 𝑣 which nodes are 
within distance 1 𝑜𝑓 𝑣 or in other words connected by an edge to 𝑣.  To 
calculate the number of two-step sequences between node u and node v in a 
graph with adjacency matrix 𝐴 = (𝑎𝑢,𝑣) we calculate for 𝐴
2 for two nodes 
(𝑢, 𝑣) with 𝑢 ≠ 𝑣 in, 
𝐴2 = ∑ 𝑎𝑢,𝑣
𝑣,𝑢∈𝑉
𝑎𝑣,𝑢 
If 𝐴2 ≠ 0 then 𝑢 can be reached from 𝑣 within two steps; 𝑢 is within 
distance 2 of 𝑣.  Higher powers can be interpreted similarly.  For example, 
if we wanted to calculate the number of three steps, we would have to raise 
the adjacency matrix A to the third power of 𝐴3, perform the same 
calculation, and so forth.  But aside from regular paths, there is also one 
path that represents the shortest path available in a network between any 
two nodes.  This path is called a “geodesic path.”  Naturally, the length of 
the geodesic path, called the “geodesic distance,” represents the shortest 
distance between two nodes in a network. 
Networks can also be complete or incomplete.  For a complete 
network, the graph is such that every pair of nodes is joined by an edge.  
The degree 𝑑𝑒𝑔𝑣 of a node 𝑣 is the number of edges which involve 𝑣 as an 
endpoint, in other words that are connected to it.  This degree can be 
calculated from the adjacency matrix,  
 






The average degree of a graph then is the average of its node degrees.  For 
instance, in Figure 4, the average degree of node 5 is 3. 
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The units of analysis in social network analysis represent the varying 
interactions that link each pair of nodes in the system.  The form and 
content of these linkages directly relate to the properties of the network 
connections.188  The links among nodes are not random and their 
components may reveal distinct substructures within the network as well as 
particular roles that actors occupy.  Identifying, analyzing, and measuring 
this form and content is part of the necessary methodological task of social 
network analysis.189  The variations of network form and content can 
explain both observed behavior of nodes in the system as well as the social 
system itself.190  To best quantify these variations, social network analysis 
employs a set of metrics as standards for evaluating form and content. 
2. The Basic Network Metrics 
Being introduced to the nomenclature of network theory and to a set 
of useful features that capture important aspects of the network structure 
will improve our understanding of the fundamental structural properties of 
a network.  While a graph can provide a visual for a network that we can 
compare to other graphs with a quick glimpse, larger networks can be more 
difficult to envision and describe.  To describe and compare these 
networks, we use a set of quantitative measures that represent some of the 
networks’ properties.  Most of these concepts and metrics derive from 
social network analysis and its application in sociological enquiry.  A 
widely-varied number of other disciplines, however, have adopted most of 
these tools so that they are now considered part of the basic network 
toolbox.191  I have selected for discussion some of the measures that are 
useful in analyzing the network data and in revealing important patterns 
and features of the international law networks. 
i.  Centrality 
Social scientists have long proposed that power is a fundamental 
property of social structures.192  In the study of networked structures, power 
is inherently relational.  The different patterns of relations within networks 
vest power in different actors and result in varied amounts of power in 
social structures we study as networks.  Social network analysis provides a 
 
 188  SCOTT, supra note 157, at 67. 
 189  RONALD S. BURT, TOWARD A STRUCTURAL THEORY OF ACTION: NETWORK MODELS 
OF SOCIAL STRUCTURE, PERCEPTION AND ACTION 22 (1982). 
 190  SCOTT, supra note 157, at 67. 
 191  See, e.g., Blaine J. Cole, Dominance Hierarchies in Leptothorax Ants, 212 SCI. 
83−84 (1981). 
 192  Michel Foucault, The Subject and Power, 8 CRITICAL INQUIRY 777−95 (1982); DAVE 
ELDER‐VASS, THE CAUSAL POWER OF SOCIAL STRUCTURES: EMERGENCE, STRUCTURE AND 
AGENCY 1 (2010). 
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set of concrete tools to approach the notion of power as attached to 
structural positions of actors within social relations.  The metric that social 
network analysis uses to describe and measure power is “centrality.”193  
Centrality measures the rough social power of a node based on its 
connectivity to the rest of the network.194  It is based on the fundamental 
premise that the way a node is embedded in the network on the basis of its 
relations with other nodes impose constrains on that node and offer 
opportunities.195  Those nodes that face fewer constraints and have more 
opportunities are in structurally favorable positions over other nodes in the 
network.196  These favorable positions may lead to quicker or more 
numerous exchanges and greater influence, and may turn a node into a 
focal point in the network, particularly in relation to other nodes that are in 
less favored positions.197 
Knoke defines this “network centrality” as “prominence in networks 
where valued information and scarce resources are transferred from one 
actor to another.”198  Centrality measures explain actor positions within a 
network including the importance and influence their position entails.199  
For instance, a node with high centrality may enjoy easier access to 
resources or information as opposed to other network nodes.  This type of 
social power does not only allow an actor to access network resources but 
also increases its influence and effect over network flows.  Such a central 
node would be better positioned to propose, shape, or alter the common 
interests or norms of the network.  In the case of international legislative 
action, these nodes would be the actors that are key in proposing or shaping 
normative prescriptions, and those nodes that garner high influence in 
pushing these prescriptions forward.  One of the key goals of analyzing a 
network is to determine who the most important or central actor in this 
network is irrespective of their de jure status in international law.  But there 
are many ways to understand the notion of “importance,” and network 
analysis represents these various conceptions in its many measures for 
centrality.  Centrality measures of degree, betweenness, closeness, and 
 
 193  MCCULLOH ET AL., supra note 172, at 52.   
 194   See Id.  
 195  See Robert Hanneman & Mark Riddle, Centrality and Power, in INTRODUCTION TO 
SOCIAL NETWORK METHODS (Robert Hanneman ed., 2005). 
 196  See Id.  
 197  Hanneman & Riddle, supra note 180, at 7.  
 198  DAVID KNONK, POLITICAL NETOWORKS: THE STRUCTURAL PERSPECTIVE, 
STRUCTURAL ANLAYSIS IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (1990); See also Linton Freeman, 
Centrality in Social Networks: Conceptual Clarification, 1 SOCIAL NETWORKS 215−39 
(1979); Karen S. Cook et al., The Distribution of Power in Exchange Networks: Theory and 
Experimental Results, 89 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY 275−305 (1983).  
 199  MCCULLOH ET AL., supra note 172, at 52. 
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eigenvector can tell us how much influence agents have within their 
network.200 
One of the simplest but most illuminating centrality measures in a 
network is “degree centrality.”  Degree centrality measures the network 
activity of each node using the concept of degrees, or the number of direct 
connections of a node.  In other words, degree centrality represents the 
amount of links each node has with other nodes in the network – it is the 
sum of all links connected to a node.201  The more links an actor has, the 
more power it may have.  In directed networks, the number of links going 
into a node represents “in-degree” centrality, while the number of links 
originating from it represents “out-degree” centrality.202  In-degree 
centrality is a measure of importance.  A node that receives many ties 
because other nodes seek to link with it is considered prominent.  Actors 
with high out-degree centrality on the other hand are often characterized as 
influential because they can exchange with others more easily or disperse 
information more quickly to other nodes in the network.203  
Mathematically, we can calculate degree centrality for node 𝑣, 
𝑑𝑣
𝑛 − 1
,𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑑𝑣  𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑑𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑣 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑛 𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑝ℎ 
Based on their degree centrality, nodes with the most ties to other 
actors hold a special place of influence within the network.204  These nodes 
are also likely to be less dependent on other nodes in the network.205  For 
instance, in a social network, individuals with many connections to others 
often have more access to people or resources, more influence over other 
nodes or in the network, and more clout than those with fewer connections.  
In a network with directed ties, the larger a node’s in-degree centrality is, 
particularly deriving from nodes with high in-degree centrality themselves, 
the more popular or influential a node is likely to be.206  For instance, a 
graphic representation of a widely cited scientific paper that effectively 
represents the measure of the paper’s in-degree centrality in a citation 
network provides a way to assess the paper’s influence and represents one 
of the most widely used manners of assessing academic research. 
 
 200  Id.  See also Alex Bavelas, A Mathematical Model for Group Structures 7 HUM. 
ORG. 16 (1948); Linton C. Freeman, Centrality in Social Networks: Conceptual 
Clarification, 1 SOC. NETWORKS 215−39 (1978). 
 201  MCCULLOH ET AL., supra note 172, at 34.  
 202  MCCULLOH ET AL., supra note 172, at 29. 
 203  See  HANNEMAN &  RIDDLE, supra note 195, at ch. 10.   
 204  MCCULLOH ET AL., supra note 172, at 33. 
 205  See Hanneman & Riddle, supra note 180. 
 206  Hubert Buch-Hansen, Social Network Analysis and Critical Realism, 44 J. THEORY 
SOC. BEHAV. 309 (2014). 
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Hafner-Burton and Montgomery posit that actors with higher degree 
centrality in the international system can “withhold social benefits such as 
membership and recognition or enact social sanctions such as 
marginalization as a method of coercion” and would “expect additional 
support in a conflict.”207  Beckfield argues that actors “with privileged 
positions in the world polity are able, to a significant degree, to set 
agendas, frame debates, and promulgate policies that benefit them.”208  The 
metrics and tools designed to rank nodes based on their position in the 
network are essential for analyzing and understanding aspects of centrality, 
interpreting the prominence of a node in a social structure.209 
The related metric of “eigenvector centrality” provides a more 
nuanced approach to degree centrality.  While degree centrality determines 
influence through a simple measure of links per actor, eigenvector 
centrality is premised on the idea that not all links are of equal value.  
Links to nodes that are themselves very highly connected will give a 
certain node more influence than links to nodes that are less connected.210  
A node will have high eigenvector centrality if it is connected to other 
highly connected nodes.  In other words, the importance of a node likely 
increases if it is connected to other nodes that are themselves important.  
Eigenvector centrality is strictly dependent on the degree centrality of the 
nodes to which a node connects.  Instead of awarding nodes one numerical 
point per connection, it gives each node a numerical score that is 
proportional to the sum of the scores of the other nodes it connects with.211  
Because of their connectedness to such highly connected nodes, nodes with 
high eigenvector centrality are also particularly influential nodes in the 
network.212 
Mathematically, beginning with the adjacency matrix 𝐴 = (𝑎𝑢,𝑣), 
where 𝑎𝑢,𝑣 ∈ {0,1} represents the availability of an edge from node 𝑢 to 
node 𝑣  
𝑎𝑢,𝑣 = 1 𝑖𝑓 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑜𝑛𝑙𝑦 𝑖𝑓 (𝑢, 𝑣) ∈ 𝐸 
 
 207  Emilie M. Hafner-Burton and Alexander H. Montgomery, Power Positions: 
International Organizations, Social Networks, and Conflict, 50 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 11 
(2006).  
 208  Emilie M. Hafner-Burton et al., Network Analysis for International Relations, 63 
INT’L ORG. 570 (2009).  
 209  Alex Bavelas, A Mathematical Model for Group Structures, 7 HUM. ORG. 16 (1948); 
Freeman, supra note 200, at 215; Ulrik Brandes, A Faster Algorithm for Betweenness 
Centrality, 25 J. MATHEMATICAL SOC’Y 163 (2001). 
 210  MCCULLOH ET AL., supra note 172, at 46.  
 211  MCCULLOH ET AL., supra note 172, at 40. 
 212  MCCULLOH ET AL., supra note 172, at 34. 
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𝑎
𝑢,𝑣={
1 𝑖𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑠 𝑢 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑣 𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑗𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝑎𝑛 𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒
0 𝑖𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑠 𝑢 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑣 𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑗𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝑎𝑛 𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒
}
 
The eigenvector centrality of a node is proportional to the sum of the 
centralities of the nodes to which it is connected.  Suppose that 𝜆 is the 
larger eigenvalue of 𝐴 and 𝑛 is the number of nodes in a graph: 
𝐴𝑥 = 𝜆𝑥, 𝜆𝑥𝑢 = ∑ 𝑎𝑢,𝑣𝑥𝑣
𝑛
𝑢=1
, 𝑢 = 1, .  .  . , 𝑛 
The metric of “betweenness centrality” captures how well situated a 
node is in terms of the paths it lies on.  It represents the extent to which a 
node lies between other nodes in the same network.213  In other words, 
betweenness centrality reflects the number of nodes each node connects to 
indirectly through its edges.214  A node with high betweenness centrality 
has significant influence over what flows between nodes in the network and 
can thus control the network’s outcomes.  Betweenness centrality 
effectively measures the number of times a node acts as an intermediary, or 
a bridge, along the shortest path between any other two points. 
A node with high betweenness centrality may access or control the 
flow of information or resources to other nodes in the network because of 
the “structural hole” it fills, a hole that would otherwise exist between the 
two other actors that this node connects.215  In other words, when two 
nodes in a network would normally be structurally disconnected, this node 
serves as a connecting point between them, as a bridge.  Betweenness 
centrality measures how often one given node serves as a bridge in a 
network.216  Because betweenness centrality indicates the amount of control 
an actor has over what passes through to other nodes of the network,217 a 
node with high betweenness centrality can fill a large number of these 
structural holes in a network and may play an important role in the 
network’s structure despite not having high degree centrality.218 
Betweenness centrality was introduced to quantify the control one 
person may have on the communication among other people in a social 
network.219  Suppose we have a social network in which rumors are being 
 
 213  WASSERMAN & FAUST, supra note 164, at 4. 
 214   Id. 
 215  See RONALD S. BURT, STRUCTURAL HOLES: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF COMPETITION 
65 (1992). 
 216   SCOTT, supra note 157, at 47–48. 
 217   Id. 
 218   SCOTT, supra note 157, at 42. 
 219  Linton C. Freeman, A Set of Measures of Centrality Based upon Betweenness, 40 
SOCIOMETRY 36, 40 (1977); Jac M. Anthonisse, The Rush in a Directed Graph, STICHTING 
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passed from one person to another.  Let us assume that every pair of nodes 
in this network exchanges a message with equal probability per unit time.  
Nodes with higher betweenness centrality are the ones through which the 
largest number of messages pass making them privy to the highest amount 
of information in this network.  These nodes have considerable influence in 
the network by virtue of the control over information passing to other 
nodes.  Removal of these nodes will also cause the most disruption in this 
network by severing the paths on which so many of these messages flow.  
Power in betweenness is premised on the capacity of an actor to broker 
contacts among other actors, to prevent such contacts, or to isolate actors.  
In the context of international law making, nodes with higher betweenness 
centrality can be those key actors that facilitate the information sharing and 
normative diffusion within a network.  Similarly, they are also the actors 
whose absence may suggest lower levels of information exchange or higher 
levels of disruptions in normative diffusion. 







where 𝐶𝑣 is the betweeness centrality value at node 𝑣, 𝜎𝑢,𝑤(𝑣) is the 
number of shortest paths between nodes 𝑢 and 𝑤 that pass through the node 
𝑣, and 𝜎𝑢,𝑤 is the number of shortest paths between node 𝑢 and 𝑤. 
The last measure of centrality I introduce here is closeness centrality, 
which is used as a measurement of “global centrality.”  Closeness centrality 
reflects the distance between elements in a defined network space.  While 
two nodes may have fewer connections than other nodes, the pattern of 
their links may allow them to access all nodes in the network more quickly 
and efficiently than other nodes.220  This closeness allows these nodes to 
better monitor the network’s flow.  Closeness centrality quantifies how 
quickly a node can reach all the other nodes of the network by measuring 
the mean distance from a node to other nodes.  Closeness centrality also 
represents the influence range of a node by assessing the set of nodes that 
are reachable from that node.  Closeness centrality is higher for nodes that 
are separated from other nodes only by a shorter distance on average. 
In a social network, a person with lower average distance will find it 
easier and faster to reach others in the network than someone with higher 
average distance.  Closeness is the inverse of the sum of the shortest 
distances between each node and every other node in the network.  The 
way to measure this is by calculating the aggregate distance from each 
 
MATHEMATISCH CENTRUM. MATHEMATISCHE BESLISKUNDE BN 9/71 (1971).  
 220  SCOTT, supra note 157, at 49. 
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node to all other nodes in the network.  This can tell us how close a node is 
likely to be to any other randomly selected node in the network.221  The 
node that has the lowest aggregate distance is the most central network 
point with the highest closeness centrality.  The nodes with the highest 
measure of closeness centrality are the ones with the best view of what is 
happening in this network.222  Power based on closeness is linked to 
exchange and bargaining but also to the ability of actors to exert power by 
serving as the focal point whose views influence a larger number of actors 
within the network. 
To calculate closeness centrality mathematically, suppose that 𝑑𝑢𝑣 is 
the length of a geodesic path from node 𝑢 to node 𝑣 and 𝑛 the number of 
nodes in a network.  As mentioned earlier, a geodesic path is the shortest 
path available in a network between any two nodes and the length of the 
geodesic path, called the geodesic distance, represents the shortest distance 
between two nodes in a graph.  The mean geodesic distance 𝑙 from 𝑢 to 𝑣, 



















And the closeness centrality for node 𝑣 is  
𝑛 − 1
∑ 𝑙(𝑢, 𝑣)𝑢≠𝑣
, 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑙(𝑢, 𝑣) 𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑛 𝑢 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑣 
ii. Connectivity 
While centrality helps identify power in a network, connectivity helps 
us answer questions of how connected parts of the network are to one 
another and to measure the resilience of a network against disruptions.  
Some networks of individuals are well-connected and are therefore more 
cohesive, and others are not.  In the social networks we engage with daily, 
certain people have more connections than others.  More connections often 
result in more exposure to information, experience, or resources and make 
highly-connected individuals more influential.  High rates of connection 
within groups also lead to, for example, a quicker spread of information 
 
 221  SCOTT, supra note 157, at 42. 
 222  SCOTT, supra note 157, at 49. 
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within the group or more and faster mobilization of actors in the face of a 
problem that requires solution. 
Connectivity is often defined as the set of mechanisms, processes, 
systems and relationships that link individuals and collectives by 
facilitating material, informational, or social exchange.223  It includes 
physical, technological, as well as social interactions and their outcomes.224  
In a network, a pair of nodes is said to be connected when linked directly or 
indirectly by an unbroken path.225  If it is possible to establish a path from 
any node to any other node in the network, then the network is connected.  
If it is impossible to connect all nodes with at least one other node in the 
network, the network is disconnected.  The aggregate connectivity of a 
network is the average cumulative fraction of the nodes reached as the 
steps performed by nodes to connect to other nodes approach infinity.  The 
more connected a network is, the more likely it is for a random pair of 
nodes to be connected to one another.226 
The connectivity of individual nodes within a network typically 
varies.  Based on their relative connectivity, nodes can be distinguished as 
hubs and non-hubs.  Hubs are those nodes that are connected to most other 
nodes in the network.227  Removing a hub or hubs from a network can 
cause significant levels of fragmentation in this network.228  Nodes connect 
through paths.  The average shortest path length describes how “globally 
connected” a graph is.  Mathematically, a path from node 𝑣0 to node 𝑣𝑛 
takes the form of an alternating sequence of nodes 𝑣 and edges 𝑒, 
(𝑣𝑜, 𝑒1, 𝑣1, 𝑒2, .  .  . , 𝑣𝑛−1𝑒𝑛, 𝑣𝑛) such that the endpoints of 𝑒1 are 𝑣𝑖−1 and 
𝑣𝑖 for 𝑖 = 1, .  .  . , 𝑛.  The distance 𝑙𝑢,𝑣 between two nodes 𝑢 and 𝑣 is the 
length of the shortest path joining them.  In a connected graph, the average 







The basic metrics for connectivity in a network are density and 
transitivity, also known as clustering coefficient.  Density reflects the ratio 
 
 223  See R. DIESTEL, GRAPH THEORY 12 (2005). 
 224  See J. L.GROSS & JAY YELLEN, HANDBOOK OF GRAPH THEORY 335 (2004).  
 225  EDWARD O. LAUMANN ET AL., THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF SEXUALITY: SEXUAL 
PRACTICES IN THE UNITED STATES 271 (2000). 
 226   Id. at 272. 
 227  Richard Medina & George Hepner, Geospatial Analysis of Dynamic Terrorist 
Networks, in VALUES AND VIOLENCE: INTANGIBLE ASPECTS OF TERRORISM 151, 151 (Ibrahim 
A. Karawan et al. eds., 2008). 
 228  Id. at 152. 
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of actual links over all possible links in a network.229  Transitivity examines 
triadic relationships (e.g. the connection between node 𝐴 and node 𝐶, 
where node 𝐵 is connected to both separately) and the balance within such 
relations.230  These measures account mostly for the inevitable fluctuations 
in relationships among nodes taking place over time.231  So that we can 
quantify these fluctuations in our network analysis, I describe these metrics 
in greater detail here. 
a. Density 
“Density” reflects the “connectedness” of an actor’s network.232  It 
represents the ratio of the actual number of links in a network over the 
potential number of links in it.233  For instance, if many of the nodes to 
which a node connects are also separately connected with each other, then 
the density of the network is higher.234 Density is a useful metric of 
connectivity because it measures the extent to which a node’s immediate 
contacts are mutually connected.  In social network terms, the more of my 
friends who are also friends with one another, the greater the density of my 
network.235  Thus, density is a good indication of the network’s cohesion 
and by extension the cost-efficiency, effectiveness, and speed within which 
information and resources flow and spread within a network.  
Mathematically, a network can have at most 𝑛 × 
𝑛−1
2




, where 𝑛 is the number of nodes in a graph and 𝐸 and is the 
total number of edges. 
We can use density to assess various themes and questions in network 
analysis but it is primarily instructive in establishing the extent of spread in 
a network, that is, the number of nodes affected by the diffusion of things 
like information, resources, and norms initiated by a single or set of 
nodes.236  For networks of international law making, density allows us to 
 
 229  In a network with “n” actors “density” is reflected by n (n-1). 
 230  See Hanneman & Riddle, supra note 180.  See also T.A.B. SNIJDERS, TRANSITIVITY 
AND TRIADS (2012). 
 231  RIIKKA VUOKKO & HELENA KARSTEN, WORKING WITH TECHNOLOGY IN COMPLEX 
NETWORKS OF INTERACTION, ORGANIZATIONAL DYNAMICS OF TECHNOLOGY-BASED 
INNOVATION: DIVERSIFYING THE RESEARCH AGENDA 334 (2007). 
 232  See Maarten de Laat, Vic Lally, Lasse Lipponen & Robert-Jan Simons, Investigating 
Patterns of Interaction in Networked Learning and Computer-Supported Collaborative 
Learning: A Role for Social Network Analysis, 2 INT’L J. COMPUTER-SUPPORTED 
COLLABORATIVE LEARNING 87, 87-103 (2007). 
 233  SCOTT, supra note 157, at 90. 
 234  See ELIZABETH BOTT, FAMILY AND SOCIAL NETWORK: ROLES, NORMS AND 
EXTERNAL RELATIONSHIPS IN ORDINARY URBAN FAMILIES 97 (1957).  
 235   SCOTT, supra note 157, at 40.  
 236  Habiba Habiba & Tanya Berger-Wolf, Working for Influence: Effect of Network 
Density and Modularity on Diffusion in Networks, IEEE 11TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE 
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look at how easily or quickly a new normative prescription can reach other 
nodes within the network.  The literature on networks, statistical models, 
and epidemiology of infectious diseases has also introduced the concept of 
“effective density” to account for the correlation of density and spread.237  
This measure of effective density is useful in international law making 
networks to assess the probability of a normative effect within a network. 
Effective density also allows us to assess the optimal spreaders in a 
network, in other words those nodes that have the capacity to maximize the 
extent of a spread of resources, information, and anything else that might 
flow through the network.  Networks, however, may not always have 
particularly influential nodes, and thus effective density may not always be 
a relevant measure in the analysis.  Habiba and Berger-Wolff’s 
epidemiological study found that in networks with low effective densities 
(“≤ .004 for real networks and ≤ .001 for synthetic” or artificial networks) a 
spread will always be low irrespective of who generates it or the 
sophistication of the approach.238  Due to the undefined structure, low 
connectivity, and skewed degree distribution of such networks, most nodes 
have few or no neighbors and are not able to send or receive a spread.  
Only hubs or nodes with high-weighted degrees are able to influence but 
there are so few of them and the nodes of the network have such low 
degrees that they hardly make a difference.239  Similarly, the researchers 
observed that, in networks with high densities (≥ 0.25 for real networks and 
≥ .0035 for synthetic networks), most nodes are well connected and a 
spread by any random node is high and comparable to a maximum spread 
due to the high similarity in connectivity of nodes.240  In such a network, 
spreads behave “almost deterministically” and are likely to affect the entire 
network, with the effect growing as density increases.241  Finally, the study 
found that in networks of intermediate densities there is a difference over 
 
ON DATA MINING WORKSHOPS 4 (2011).  
 237  Id.; see also David Kempe et al., Maxmizing the Spread of Influence Through a 
Social Network, PROCEEDINGS NINTH ACM SIGKDD INT’L CONF. KNOWLEDGE DISCOVERY 
& DATA MINING (2003); B. Aditya Prakash et al., Virus Propagation on Time-Varying 
Networks: Theory and Immunization Algorithms, JOINT EUROPEAN CONF. MACHINE 
LEARNING & KNOWLEDGE DISCOVERY DATABASES (J.L. Balcazar et al. eds., 2010); 
Hanghang Tong et al., On the Vulnerability of Large Graphs, IEEE 10TH INT’L CONFERENCE 
ON DATA MINING 1091–1096 (2010); Nicholas C. Valler et al., Epidemic Spread in Mobile 
Ad Hoc Networks: Determining the Tipping Point, INT’L CONF. RES. NETWORKING (2011); 
see also DAVID KEMPE ET AL., MAXIMIZING THE SPREAD OF INFLUENCE THROUGH A SOCIAL 
NETWORK (2015). 
 238  Habiba & Berger-Wolf, supra note 236, at 5. 
 239  Id.  
 240  Id. 
 241  Id.  
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the extent to which the spread is sensitive to the identity of the initiator.242  
In sum, in low-density networks, higher spread can likely be achieved only 
by high-degree nodes.  In very dense networks, any node can initiate a 
spread that can potentially reach most if not all of the network.243  Knowing 
the density of a network allows us to know whether there are nodes in a 
network that are particularly influential over others, that their influence can 
reach a maximum number of nodes in a network, and how to identify them. 
But density is also limited as a measure of comparative social 
structure in an important way.  Given its quality, density varies with the 
size of a network.  This is because it is highly unlikely that actors can 
sustain an unlimited number of relationships with other actors due to 
limitations of resources such as time, social interaction, and outreach.244  In 
other words, very large networks are potentially less dense as it is less 
likely that actors can build and maintain an exponentially large number of 
connections.  All other things being equal, an increase in the number of 
actors in a network beyond a certain size will automatically lead to a 
respective decrease in its density.245  Some of the networks we encounter in 
international law making may be such large networks in which case 
looking at density is an important but not conclusive element in identifying 
the influence of their nodes. 
b. Transivity / Clustering Coefficient 
The most fundamental connection among nodes in a network is the 
link between a pair of nodes, what we have been calling an edge.  A 
collection of nodes that have a connection with each other through one 
edge and are directly adjacent is called a “neighborhood.”  A relation 
between nodes becomes transitive when, for instance node 𝑢 is connected 
to node 𝑣, and node 𝑣 is connected to node 𝑤.  Node 𝑢 is thus also 
effectively connected to node 𝑤, but through a transitive relationship.  The 
transivity of node 𝑢 then is the proportion of neighbors of 𝑢 which are 
neighbors themselves.  In social network terms, the friend of my friend is 
also my friend.  Perhaps the fact that 𝑢 knows 𝑣 and 𝑣 knows 𝑤 doesn’t 
necessarily mean that 𝑢 knows 𝑤, but it makes it more likely that the friend 
of my friend is also my friend than some other randomly chosen member of 
the network.  This effectively creates a set of triangular relationships that 
are then used to measure a variable we call the clustering coefficient. 
 
 
 242  Id. 
 243  Habiba & Berger-Wolf, supra note 236, at 7−8. 
 244  Edward O. Laumann et al., The Boundary Specification Problem in Network 
Analysis, in APPLIED NETWORK ANALYSIS 20 (Ronald Burt & Michael Minor eds., 1983). 
 245  See SCOTT, supra note 157, at 43−44. 
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Mathematically, we measure the clustering coefficient of a node 𝑣, 













iii. Similarity or Equivalence 
A more abstract aspect of understanding patterns of relations within 
networks is that of similarity.246  In what way are certain nodes similar to 
each other and how can we quantify this similarity?  Notions of similarity 
force us to think about actors not only individually as entities but also 
within sets of categories.  We can identify these categories, but also single 
out principles that apply to those categories and their actors.  In this 
process, we search for those actors that are most similar and, in turn, try to 
systematize what makes them similar, what makes them different, and from 
which other actors or categories of actors they differ.  In social network 
analysis, we base this taxonomy on similarities of patterns of relations 
among actors rather than individual actor attributes.247  These often 
represent the “social roles” and “social positions” actors might share, or 
similar building blocks that provide regularities in patterns of relations 
among them.248  For example, the social role of a “husband” typically 
implies a patterned set of interactions with a member of other social 
categories such as “wife,” “husband,” or “child.” 
Social network analysis translates this idea in suggesting that similar 
nodes may be connected to the same or similar nodes and can therefore be 
substitutable if one fails or decides to leave the network.249  There are two 
main approaches to understanding similarity in networks: regular 
equivalence and structural equivalence.  Two nodes in a network are 
 
 246  HOLTON, supra note 36, at 55.  
 247  See generally A. James O’Malley & Peter V. Marsden, The Analysis of Social 
Networks, 8 HEALTH SERV. & OUTCOMES RES. METHODOLOGY 222 (2008). 
 248  WASSERMAN & FAUST, supra note 164, at 463.  
 249  See Noah E. Friedkin, Structural Cohesion and Equivalence Explanations of Social 
Homogeneity, 12 SOC. METHODS & RES. 235 (1984); Ronald S. Burton, Social Contagion 
and Innovation: Cohesion Versus Structural Equivalence, 92 AM. J. SOC. 1287, 1291 
(1987); Mark S. Mizruchi, Cohesion, Equivalence, and Similarity of Behavior: A 
Theoretical and Empirical Assessment, 15 SOC. NET. 275, 279, 282−3 (1993).  
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regularly equivalent if they have similar neighboring nodes.250  For 
instance, two law professors at different universities may not have any 
friends in common but they may be similar in that they each know a lot of 
other law professors, law students, administrative staff, and so forth.  
Structural equivalence on the other hand is established if two nodes share 
many of the same network nodes.251  Two professors at the same law 
school, for instance, who share many of the same colleagues are often 
structurally equivalent.  Measures of structural equivalence are generally 
more frequent and better developed than regular equivalence. 
 
Figure 5 
The idea behind structural equivalence is to identify uniform actions 
and links that define certain social positions within a network.252  Lorrain 
and White first introduced structural equivalence in social network analysis 
as a metric of identifying equivalent nodes.253  They define two nodes as 
structurally equivalent if they have the same relations linking them to the 
same nodes in the network.254  Structural equivalence in this sense is the 
presence of identical ties to and from specific network actors.255  Lorrain 
and White understand structurally equivalent nodes as interchangeable in 
the network in which these nodes operate.256  Exactly structurally 
equivalent nodes are substitutable since they mirror each other’s’ 
 
 250  Ruoming Jin et al., Scalable and Axiomatic Ranking of Network Role Similarity, 8 
ACM TRANSACTIONS KNOWLEDGE DISCOVERY FROM DATA 1, 6 (2014). 
 251  Id. 
 252  SCOTT, supra note 157, at 126.  
 253  SCOTT, supra note 185, at 129. 
 254  Lee Douglas Sailer, Structural Equivalence: Meaning and Definition, Computation 
and Application, 1 SOC. NETWORKS 73, 76 (1978).  
 255  WASSERMAN & FAUST, supra note 164, at 366. 
 256  See Noah E. Friedkin, Structural Cohesion and Equivalence Explanations of Social 
Homogeneity, 12 SOC. METHODS & RES. 235 (1984); Ronald S. Burton, Social Contagion 
and Innovation: Cohesion Versus Structural Equivalence, 92 AM. J. SOC. 1287, 1291 
(1987); Mark S. Mizruchi, Cohesion, Equivalence, and Similarity of Behavior: A 
Theoretical and Empirical Assessment, 15 SOC. NETWORKS 275, 278−79, 282 (1993). 
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relationships to all other nodes.  In Figure 6, nodes 𝐸 and 𝐹 each have a 
single link to node 𝐵 and an identical pattern of ties that makes them 
structurally equivalent.  The same applies to nodes 𝐻 and 𝐼 as they too 
occupy identical positions in the diagram. 
 
Figure 6 Wasserman-Faust network to illustrate equivalence classes
257
 
More recent work in social network analysis suggests that exact 
structural equivalence is very rare, especially in larger networks.258  Based 
on this insight, newer models for structural equivalence have become less 
strict.259  These models examine the degree of structural equivalence rather 
than merely the presence of exactly identical ties.260  These analyses of 
structural equivalence, instead of searching for identical relations, aim to 
find actors who are sufficiently similar in order to be regarded as 
structurally equivalent.261  The researcher must decide what threshold to 
apply in establishing which actors to regard as sufficiently similar to deem 
structurally equivalent and, as a consequence, substitutable.262  Actors in a 
network may occupy positions of structural equivalence without the rest of 
the network’s actors knowing or having recognized this effect.  New roles 
often emerge in a network in this way: the actions and relations among 
agents may begin to crystallize into these roles before the rest of the 
network fully perceives these roles for what they are.  Identifying 
structurally equivalent actors is one way of identifying such emerging roles 
 
 257  See generally Hanneman & Riddle, supra note 180. 
 258  See generally Noah E. Friedkin, Structural Cohesion and Equivalence Explanations 
of Social Homogeneity, 12 SOC. METHODS & RES. 235 (1984); Ronald S. Burton, Social 
Contagion and Innovation: Cohesion Versus Structural Equivalence, 92 AM. J. SOC. 1287, 
1291 (1987); Mark S. Mizruchi, Cohesion, Equivalence, and Similarity of Behavior: A 
Theoretical and Empirical Assessment, 15 SOC. NETWORK 275, 279, 282-3 (1993). 
 259  WASSERMAN & FAUST, supra note 164, at 364−65.  
 260  Hanneman & Riddle, supra note 180, at 200. 
 261  SCOTT, supra note 157, at 123.  
 262  Id.  
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in a network.263 
There are two primary models for measuring structural equivalence.  
First, White and Lorrain’s model measures the structural equivalence of 
two actors by correlating the columns of an adjacency matrix.264  The 
higher the coefficient correlation between a pair of columns and actors, the 
more structurally equivalent these actors are.265  This original construction 
of social equivalence was mainly a means of describing the characteristics 
of social structures.  Later, Burt began to utilize the concept of structural 
equivalence to predict the behavior of actors based on their social roles.266  
According to Burt’s model, structurally equivalent actors would be more 
likely to behave similarly than even actors that have been grouped together 
on the basis of interests, identity, or cohesion.267  This idea provides the 
major insight of measures of structural equivalence: by knowing the 
structurally equivalent actors in a network, we can predict to an extent the 
behavior of all of those actors if we know how one of them behaves. 
To mathematically calculate for either model of structural 
equivalence, we first need to understand it in sets.  A set is a collection of 
objects that represent the elements or members of that set.  Two sets, 𝐴 
and 𝐵, are defined to be equal when they have precisely the same elements; 
that is, if every element of 𝐴 is an element of 𝐵 and every element of 𝐵 is 
an element of 𝐴.  If sets 𝐴 and 𝐵 are equal, then we write 𝐴 =  𝐵.  The 
elements of the sets can be anything but in the case of networks the 
elements for our sets are the nodes in the network.  The intersection 𝐴 ∩ 𝐵 
of two sets 𝐴 and 𝐵 represents the set that contains all elements of 𝐴 that 
also belong to 𝐵, or all elements of 𝐵 that also belong to 𝐴, but no other 
elements.  The union 𝐴 ∪ 𝐵 of two sets 𝐴 and 𝐵 represents the set of those 
elements that are either in 𝐴, or in 𝐵, or in both. 
We measure the similarity of two sets 𝐴 and 𝐵 with the Jaccard index.  
The Jaccard index, also known as the Jaccard similarity coefficient, is a 
statistic measure for comparing the similarity and diversity of sample sets.  
In the Jaccard index, we represent the similarity of 𝐴 and 𝐵, 
 
 263  SCOTT, supra note 157, at 122.  
 264  See JOHN SCOTT, 4 SOCIAL NETWORKS: CRITICAL CONCEPTS IN SOCIOLOGY 129 
(2002). 
 265  Mark S. Mizruchi, Cohesion, Equivalence, and Similarity of Behavior: A Theoretical 
and Empirical Assessment, 15 SOC. NETWORKS 275, 282 (1993).  
 266  BURT, supra note 189, at 22.  
 267  See Ronald S. Burt, Cohesion Versus Structural Equivalence as a Basis for Network 
Subgroups, in APPLIED NETWORK ANALYSIS: A METHODOLOGICAL INTRODUCTION 262, 272 
(Ronald S. Burt & Michael J. Minor eds., 1983); see also Joseph Galaskiewicz & Ronald S. 
Burton, Interorganization Contagion in Corporate Philanthropy, 36 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 88 
(1991); BURT, supra note 189, at 190. 
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We say that 𝐴 and 𝐵 are disjoint if 𝐴 does not intersect 𝐵, in other words, if 
they have no elements in common.  If 𝐴 and 𝐵 are disjoint then 𝐽(𝐴, 𝐵) =
0.  If 𝐴 = 𝐵 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝐽(𝐴, 𝐵) = 1.  Given two nodes 𝑢 and 𝑣 in a graph, the 
Jaccard index provides a simple and useful way to compare the similarity 
of their neighborhoods.  The structural equivalence of two nodes 𝑢 and 𝑣 is 
the similarity of their neighborhoods, as measured by the Jaccard index: 




1 when 𝑢 and 𝑣 have identical neighborhoods 
0 when the neighborhoods of 𝑢 and 𝑣 are disjoint
 
iv. The Basic Network Topologies 
The form and structure of a network are highly dependent on the 
metrics of the network nodes and nodes’ connections.  Graph theory 
describes how these metrics and connections structurally position nodes by 
visualizing them and compiling them in certain types of topologies.  While 
these topologies are as manifold as the possibilities of connection within a 
network, I address here some of the most frequent ones that we often 
encounter when analyzing networks. 
a. Point-to-Point Network 
When two nodes are connected through an edge, the link between 
them is called a point-to-point link.  Networks that consist of point-to-point 
links are called point-to-point networks.  To better understand this concept, 
we can think of a computer network.  Such a network typically involves 
one station that is configured to receive a connection and another station 
that initiates the connection.  Within this network and in between the two 
stations, point-to-point links operate as dedicated circuits between the 
stations to achieve higher data transfer rates.268  We also find point-to-point 
networks in the airline industry:  it is the simplest type of network 
architecture that connects each origin with another via a one non-stop 
flight.269  A point-to-point network in the airline industry has traditionally 
 
 268  MICHAEL E. WHITMAN ET AL., GUIDE TO NETWORK SECURITY 280 (2012); see also 
JEFF MESNIL, MOBILE AND WEB MESSAGING: MESSAGING PROTOCOLS FOR WEB AND MOBILE 
DEVICES 3 (2014). 
 269  Gerald N. Cook & Jeremy Goodwin, Airline Networks: A Comparison of Hub-and-
Spoke and Point-to-Point Systems, 17 J. AVIATION/AEROSPACE EDU. & RES. 2, 55 (2008). 
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In terms of network architecture, point-to-point networks can have a 
line, tree, star, ring, or mesh topology.  The line structure is the simplest 
form of network structure in which every node connects with one path to 
the next node in sequence. 
 
Figure 8 
In a tree network, two nodes have exactly one path between them.  It 
often represents a hierarchical structure that stems from a principal node 
called the tree root, which forms a common link for multiple nodes, 






 270  Eldad Ben-Yosef, The Evolution of the US Airline Industry: Technology, Entry, and 
Market Structure – Three Revolutions, 72 J. AIR L. & COMM., 305, 325 (2007).  
 271  Samuel Pierre, Intelligent and Heuristic Approaches and Tools for the Topological 
Design of Data Communication Networks, in DATABASE AND DATA COMMUNICATION 
NETWORK SYSTEMS: TECHNIQUES AND APPLICATIONS 289, 295 (Cornelius T. Leondes ed., 
2002). 
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The star topology is also a tree kind of topology but one that contains 
one central node—the star—that is connected by a point-to-point link to all 
other nodes of the network.272 
 
Figure 10 
In a ring topology, each node connects to exactly two other nodes 
forming one single continuous pathway.  In other words, all nodes form a 




Finally, nodes form a mesh topology when each pair of nodes in a 




 272  Id. 
 273  Id. 
 274  Id. 
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b. Hub-and-Spoke Network 
While point-to-point networks are often the basic network 
architecture, point-to-point links tend to become part of centralized or 
distributed network structures that include nodes connected directly or 
through more centralized nodes called hubs.275  Such networks take the 
form of hub-and-spoke networks.  Based on their relative connectivity, 
nodes are classified as hubs and non-hubs.  Nodes with higher degrees of 
connectivity are defined as hubs.276  In other words, a hub is a node with a 
larger number of links surrounded by nodes that have fewer links, also 
known as non-hubs.277  Hubs are those nodes that have the most structured 
and intense relationships to other nodes in the network and functionally 
become “privileged nodes.”278  They are the network’s strongest links.279  
Hubs’ structural position within the network facilitates connectivity 
between interacting nodes.280  Hubs are thus the main means of information 
management, exchange,281 and cooperation in a network.282  A hub 
concentrates the network flow not only spatially but also temporally, and 
maximizes connectivity.283 
The notion of hubs is used in many disciplines and sectors: hub-and-
spoke free trade agreements;284 medical research networks;285 education;286 
 
 275  Ben-Yosef, supra note 270, at 326. 
 276  ASFAR S. AZMI, SYSTEMS BIOLOGY IN CANCER RESEARCH AND DRUG DISCOVERY 173 
(2012).  
 277  Kyaw Tun et al., Rich Can Get Poor: Conversion of Hub to Non-Hub Proteins, 2 
SYS. AND SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY 75 (2008). 
 278   PETER J. TAYLOR, WORLD CITY NETWORK: A GLOBAL URBAN ANALYSIS 26 (2004). 
 279  RICHARD KOCK & GREG LOCKWOOD, SUPERCONNECT: HARNESSING THE POWER OF 
NETWORKS AND THE STRENGTH OF WEAK LINKS 67 (2011). 
 280  Morton E. O’Kelly, A Geographer’s Analysis of Hub-and-Spoke Networks, 6 J. 
TRANSP. GEOGRAPHY 171 (1998). 
 281  Tun et al., supra note 277, at 79. 
 282  KOCK & LOCKWOOD, supra note 279. 
 283  GUILLAUME BURGHOUWT, AIRLINE NETWORK DEVELOPMENT IN EUROPE AND ITS 
IMPLICATIONS FOR AIRPORT PLANNING 15 (2007).  
 284  Jung Hur et al., Effects of Hub-and-Spoke Free Trade Agreements on Trade: A Panel 
Data Analysis, 38 WORLD DEVELOPMENT 1105 (2010); see, e.g., Carsten Kowalczyk & 
Ronald J. Wonnacott, Hubs and Spokes, and Free Trade in the Americas 2 (Nat’l Bureau 
Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 4198, 1992) (“In August, 1992, Canada, Mexico and the 
United States presented a free trade agreement (FTA) to cover a North American market 
with a combined GNP approaching $7 trillion and an annual trade in goods and services 
among its members exceeding $270 billion.  Although this agreement is essentially in a 
trilateral PTA format, full ratification by all three countries IS not guaranteed.  If Canada 
were not to ratify, the result could be a Mexico-U.S. bilateral ETA, creating a hub-and-
spoke system in which the United States as the hub would have one bilateral spoke 
agreement with Canada (the 1989 Canada-U.S. PTA), and another with Mexico; in other 
words, two free trade areas overlapping on the United States.”). 
 285  PETER J. TAYLOR & BEN DERUDDER, WORLD CITY NETWORK: A GLOBAL URBAN 
ANALYSIS 15 (2015). 
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money laundering; banking;287 diplomacy;288 air and rail transportation and 
telecommunications, shipping; and postal mail systems.289  Hub-and-spoke 
networks increased as the need for multiple origin nodes to connect to 
multiple destination nodes in a network increased and made the point-to-
point system that directly connects every origin node to every destination 
node inefficient and, at times, practically unattainable.  The hub-and-spoke 
network aggregates all flow into one hub that is fully connected, or into 
multiple hubs that are connected via an inter-hub (hub-hub) link.  When 
compared with a point-to-point network, the hub-and-spoke network has a 
smaller number of links.  But since most traffic flows through the hub or 
through the inter-hub links, the network has quicker flow and significantly 
less transactional and operating costs.290  Networks that include hubs also 
have more internal hierarchy despite the typical decentralized nature of 
most networks.291  Knowing the topology of a network including the 
presence of a hub or hubs allows us to have a better structural sense of the 
networks, improve our understanding of network flows, and identify the 
actors that are critical to network flows. 
The simplest topology of a hub in a network is that of a hub-and-
spoke represented by a wheel that contains the hub node in the center, 
linked to nodes at the outside end of each spoke.292 
 
 286  JANE KNIGHT, INTERNATIONAL EDUCATION HUBS: STUDENT, TALENT, KNOWLEDGE-
INNOVATION MODELS 20 (2013).  
 287  TAYLOR & DERUDDER, supra note 285, at 26.  
 288  Ian L.G. Wadley, U.S. and Them: Hubs, Spokes, & Integration with Reference to 
Transboundary Environment and Resources Issues, 21 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 572, 576 
(2003). 
 289  Sibel Alumur & Bahar Y. Kara, Network Hub Location Problems: The State of the 
Art, 190 EUROPEAN J. OPERATIONAL RES. 1, 13 (2008); see BURGHOUWT, supra note 283, at 
2−3 (arguing that after the United States deregulation most major U.S. airline dropped their 
point-to-point structures and introduced hub-and-spoke networks instead) (“These are 
concentrated spatially around one or more hub airports where passengers can transfer to 
their connecting flights within a limited time window . . . . In a highly competitive market, 
hub-and-spoke systems offer an airline the opportunity to benefit from certain cost and 
demand side advantages, to deter entry, and to exercise some bureaucratic control over the 
hub airport.”); see also Ben-Yosef, supra note 270, at 327. 
 290  Yu An et al., The Reliable Hub-and-Spoke Design Problem: Models and Algorithms, 
77 TRANSPORT RES. PART B: METHODOLOGICAL 103 (2015). 
 291  PETER J. TAYLOR & BEN DERUDDER, WORLD CITY NETWORK: A GLOBAL URBAN 
ANALYSIS 26 (2015). 
 292  O’Kelly, supra note 280, at 172. 
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Figure 13 
The central hub in this network enjoys optimal connectivity as it 
connects to all nodes through the spokes and is primarily responsible for 
the total connectivity in a hub-and-spoke network.  The outside nodes have 
minimal connectivity, connecting mainly through the hub, and not to each 
other.  We can categorize hubs into three main topologies based on the 
remaining structural qualities of the network, as represented in Figure 14 
below.  In centralized networks, a central hub resembles a star topology.  
The central node of the star is the hub, and all traffic originates from it or 
flows through it.  In a decentralized network, there are multiple smaller 
centralized hubs.  And finally, in a distributed network, there are no 







 293  See generally ALBERT-LÁSZLÓ BARABÁSI, LINKED: HOW EVERYTHING IS CONNECTED 
TO EVERYTHING ELSE AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR BUSINESS, SCIENCE, AND EVERYDAY LIFE 
(2003). 
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c. Cliques 
While the above topologies look at the network as a whole, we can 
also analyze the network from the perspective of its “sub-cultures.”  Any 
numerically smaller neighborhoods of nodes, such as dyads and triads, are 
considered a sub-culture with a corresponding substructure.  The main 
approach to understanding the structure of a network’s subculture is to 
measure the density of the connection of the nodes in the subculture.  When 
every node in this substructure is connected to every other node and no 
other nodes can be added to it without making it less connected, we define 
this denser cluster as a “clique.”294  For example, a set of six nodes in a 
network is a clique if and only if each of these six nodes is directly 
connected to the other five and there is no other node anywhere in the 
network that could be added to make a group of six connected nodes 
instead of five.  A clique indicates a highly cohesive subgroup whose nodes 
are highly connected—a group of classmates in a high school for instance. 
 
 
IV. CONCLUSION & NEXT RESEARCH STEPS 
The Westphalian model of international law has been slow and 
reluctant in identifying and assessing the effects of non-state actors in 
international law making.295  The partiality of legal personality may, in part, 
explain this inertia.  The discourse used in international law is evidence of 
the central bias that holds the state as the main, and, at times, sole point of 
reference in international law making.  As Philip Alston suggested, 
international law suffers from the “not-a-cat-syndrome” in its reference to 
 
 294  Hanneman & Riddle, supra note 180, at 365.  
 295  Celia R. Taylor, A Modest Proposal: Statehood and Sovereignty in a Global Age, 18 
U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L., 745, 746 (1997). 
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“non-state actors” as “non-state.”296  This marginalizes the scope of 
research and reinforces “the assumption that the state is the only central 
actor.”297  Other disciplines have been quicker or perhaps less resistant to 
recognize the transition from a hierarchical structure to a network one, and 
to embrace networks, either mixed with other structures, or in isolation.  
The analytic questions posed by other disciplines relating to their networks 
and methodological processes have much to offer to a nascent network 
analysis of international law.  They can help us learn to recognize networks 
in various parts of life and law.  Being able to adjust our mental lenses 
provides us with an extra set, the set of networks, that can complement 
existing viewpoints, offer a more nuanced description of international 
legislative action, and help answer faltering questions. 
Social scientists have, for years, developed a set of methods to study 
patterns of connection and social relations.  They have used these methods 
to approach many classic problems premised on relation and connection.  
Applying these methods beyond the field of social sciences can enrich our 
understanding of other fields, such as law.  Social network analysis is a 
valuable tool for identifying and mapping actors’ relationships by 
providing a descriptive account of the nature and effects of the networks 
these actors are involved in.  It offers a way to quantify the impact of actors 
in the making of international law but also tailor networked solutions to 
existing international problems through legislative action.  By applying a 
series of metrics and algorithms, social network analysis can offer a more 
empirically comprehensive analysis of international law making and 
complement existing or proposed theoretical frameworks. 
By means of this Article, I have aimed to show how the tools of 
network analysis describe the relations between actors in a network, and 
how they can be applied on different relational and networked contexts 
such as those of international legislative action.  Becoming more familiar 
with these methods will help see the problems and possibilities of 
international law making in new ways.  These methods, however, are only 
tools.  The next step for future research on the intersection between 
international law and network analysis is to apply the methods and 
frameworks to specific networks that emerge in international law making to 
address international problems through international normative 
development such as treaty, customary international law, or even soft law. 
Who are the actors responsible for the making of international law 
today?  Which of those actors matter most, and why?  What type of 
synergies do they form in the making of international law?  Can we map 
 
 296  Alston, supra note 55, at 3. 
 297   Id. 
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the development of international law norms by configuring the 
relationships among these actors?  What can we learn about the emergence, 
crystallization, and decline of international law norms from looking at these 
interactions?  Are networks more effective at putting forward normative 
developments in international law, and under what terms?  What can these 
insights offer to current and future international legislative action?  
Network analysis not only allows us to measure and map these new 
dynamics but also provides the springboard on which to build a new 
framework for international legislative action.  Network analysis paints a 
much clearer picture of whom to call upon when putting forward a 
legislative agenda, when to introduce a normative prescription, and how to 
best diffuse it based on the actors involved in each legislative process.  
Network analysis also helps us determine the most powerful actors or the 
leaders in various networks, and to quantify the effect of their position to 
normative development.  Finally, network analysis allows us to map how 
actors influence each other’s normative preferences and outcomes, the 
preferences and outcomes of their networks and other networks, what they 
learn from each other, and how they are likely to act based on the structures 
they are embedded in. 
International law has been slow in systematically addressing issues of 
method.  International law making is one of the areas that most requires 
methodological insight, conceptual clarity, and legal certainty.  
Methodological advances in this field can significantly contribute to 
ongoing normative and procedural debates, enlighten future law and policy 
making, and increase legal certainty.  Understanding and integrating these 
insights is critical to mapping existing and future successful international 
legislative action.  These are just some of the many avenues for future 
research that have the potential to clarify the landscape of international 
lawmaking using the methodological lens of network theory. 
 
